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IN LUCE TUA 
Comment on Contemporary A ffairs by the Editor 
The Abortion Muddle 
It's not depressing that the politicians are talking 
about religion; it is depressing that they are talking 
about it so badly. Not in recent memory has a major 
issue been so buried in intellectual and moral confusion. 
Elsewhere in these pages, Gail McGrew Eifrig sorts out 
some of the larger questions involved; here we propose 
to look only at the specific question of abortion, which is 
by any reasonable measure the most significant of the 
contested issues in our current wars of religion. 
We might begin by noting that abortion is not, in the 
narrow sense, a religious question at all. Roman Cath-
olics oppose abortion, but so do a great many other peo-
ple whose attitudes towards Catholicism range from 
sympathetic non-affiliation to total antipathy. Abortion 
is not a sectarian or denominational issue, and those 
who define it in those terms are guilty of obfuscation. 
Geraldine Ferraro contributed greatly to the con-
fusion on this issue by attributing her "personal" oppo-
sition to abortion (as opposed to what can only reason-
ably be termed her public support of it) to a "gift of 
faith" that she appears to ascribe uniquely to people of 
her religious persuasion. But Catholics have for cen-
turies argued such questions on the basis not of religious 
revelation or deposit of faith but of natural law, a law of 
moral discernment open to all men and women without 
regard to Christian commitment or understanding. 
When we argue about abortion we are not in the cate-
gory of debate involved in, say, doctrines of the Immac-
ulate Conception; we are concerned rather with issues 
open to all people on the basis of natural reason. Does 
anyone seriously believe that the questions of when life 
begins or whether it is subject to protection by the state 
are matters of obscurantist theological dispute? 
These are public issues, subject to public debate. Pro-
choice advocates insist that abortion is a private matter 
and that it is impermissible for those who oppose abor-
tion to "impose" their beliefs on those who do not. After 
all, they argue, we would not require pro-lifers to have 
abortions; why should they insist that we not have them? 
Governor Mario Cuomo of New York recently carried 
the argument a step further by distinguishing between 
categories of sin and crime and attempting to argue that 
anti-abortionists, like prohibitionists of an earlier age, 
were confusing the former with the latter. 
But the whole point of the pro-life argument is that 
abortion cannot be considered a private matter precisely 
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because it involves the taking of other, innocent life. 
The right of private decision ends where it interferes 
with the public rights of others, and it is at that same 
point where sin edges over into crime. The only coher-
ent moral argument in favor of free choice on abortion 
involves the assumption that fetal life is not human life, 
and it is noteworthy how seldom the pro-choice argu-
ment focuses on that issue. 
We offer no serious moral consideration to "free 
choice" on such matters as slavery or racial discrimina-
tion. Why should we do so with respect to abortion? 
Surely arguments concerning privacy or the right of 
women to control their own bodies (not to mention such 
moral absurdities as the assumption that lives not eager-
ly anticipated by the parents are not worth the living) 
cannot be considered on the same moral plane as the 
right to life. 
The most plausible pro-choice argument has to do 
with civic virtue rather than moral virtue. Whatever the 
ultimate rights or wrongs of abortion, pro-choice advo-
cates suggest, the American people have not yet reached 
a moral consensus on the question. (That the public is 
ambivalent on the matter seems clear: opinion polls 
regularly reveal a majority of Americans opposed to a 
ban on all abortions, but those same polls find a majority 
opposed to abortion-on-demand.) Given that lack of 
consensus, it is argued, pro-life people sho"uld, in the 
interests of civility, tolerance, and respect for pluralism, 
refrain from insisting that their opposition to abortion 
be written into law. They should try to persuade others 
to their point of view rather than coerce them. 
That argument has its attractions, but also its obvious 
limits. Civility is a high democratic virtue, but pro-
choice people ought to understand why pro-lifers insist 
that it cannot take precedence over what they see as the 
protection of innocent life. In any case, the pro-life 
Hatch amendment would not ban abortions; it would 
simply leave the matter open for state and federal 
governments to handle through the legislative process. 
If, as pro-choice people insist, they have the public with 
them on the issue, they will be able to block restrictions 
on abortion. If they can't, perhaps there is more of a con-
sensus against abortion-on-demand than they suppose. 
One thing is certain: the American people can only 
hope to reach an informed consensus on abortion if the 
arguments concerning it on either side are presented to 






Is There a Real Difference? 
Over several years of written and oral conversation, 
Jim Nuechterlein and I have deliberated about an inter-
esting question: is the distinction between neoconserva-
tism and neoliberalism a distinction without a differ-
ence? As he once nicely put it: "As an intellectual exer-
cise, the neoconservative/ neoliberal distinctions are 
worth making and maintaining, but they are, in effect, 
family quarrels. In reality you will get a lot more sym-
pathetic hearing from people like me than from hardly 
any of your old liberal friends." Now that was a nice 
existential way of framing the issue, since I have tried 
to define myself as a neoliberal and he finds himself 
comfortable with the other label. I am interested in 
finding out whether I have departed so far from Amer-
ican liberalism that my old friends will no longer hear 
me out, and I will have to resort to conversations with 
cranks like Nuechterlein. 
The best way to find this out is to articulate what neo-
liberalism means to me. In so doing I will be in the com-
pany of others who consider themselves to be neo-
liberals, but my main purpose is a confessional one 
rather than a detached, objective effort at precise de-
scription. If sufficient disagreement is elicited from 
Mr. Nuechterlein, perhaps we have a real difference. 
American liberalism, at least since Franklin Roose-
velt, has focused on the inclusion of the newcomers, the 
have-nots, and the excluded into American politics, 
Robert Benne is Jordan- Trexler Professor of Religr:on and 
Chairman of the Department of Religion and Philosophy at 
Roanoke College, where he is also Director of the Center for 
Church and Society. He is the author of The Ethic of Dem-
ocratic Capitalism: A Moral Reassessment. His article, 
"Capitalism and the Moral Order," appeared in The Cresset 
in October, 1983. 
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and, through the political levers at their new-found 
disposal, better entrance into the American economy 
and society. That is why the Democrats continue to be 
the party of recent immigrants, the working poor, the 
poverty-stricken, blacks, and, more recently, women. 
American liberalism's concern for justice-fair political 
representation , fair equality of opportunity, and a basic 
social and economic minimum-has a continuing moral 
appeal for me. At their best, conservatism and neocon-
servatism have consolidated and streamlined liberal-
ism's programs, though they have rarely initiated such 
efforts at inclusion. At their worst, they have tried to 
dismantle rather than reform the initiatives of the lib-
erals, though they have rarely been successful in such 
negative reactions. As a liberal , I want to continue to 
be on the initiating side of things, since I believe there 
are many challenges before us that demand just-making 
policies. 
If liberalism has such a moral appeal and has been 
relatively successful, why is there a need to affix a "neo" 
to it? Because, I believe, the old liberalism, represented 
by the Ted Kennedy wing of the Democratic Party, had 
and continues to have four liabilities that call for re-
thinking. The old liberalism ignores or denigrates the 
role of the private economy; its policies tend toward a 
statist centralization; it has a too-expansive notion of 
government concern and competence; and it has invited 
in its quest for inclusion groups whose outlook seriously 
contradicts traditional American values concerning 
patriotism, family , and religion. Such tendencies, if not 
reversed, will sentence American liberalism to minority 
status in the future. 
It is interesting to note how forcefully this year's 
Democratic National Convention addressed the first 
and fourth of these liabilities. However, the address to 
the first carried with it major governmental interven-
tions into the private economy of a protectionist nature. 
The second and third liabilities were actually rein-
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forced by the implication that government would wipe 
every tear away from those who for any reason suffer in 
the United States. 
Be that as it may, neoliberals want fresh , imaginative 
policies that do not carry with them the liabilities of the 
old liberalism. First, neoliberals want to emphasize the 
importance of non-inflationary growth in the private 
economy. They are firmly in favor of the vitality ex-
pressed by a dynamic, competitive market economy. 
They know that the general level of well-being of so-
ciety is much more the result of non-inflationary eco-
nomic growth than of the influence of government pro-
grams. They are pro-business in so far as business plays 
by the rules and operates in a workably competitive 
context. And they certainly do not identify bigness with 
badness, as so many left-wing Democrats in fact do. In 
short, a neoliberal can believe in democratic capitalism 
with a good conscience. In my own book, The Ethic of 
Democratic Capitalism-A Moral Reassessment, I have 
listed other contributions of a market economy to our 
democratic society. I believe it to be a compelling case 
that market economies are helpful partners to democ-
racy, and vice-versa. So, neoliberals affirm the market 
economy. 
Second, neoliberals suggest that we must find ways to 
pursue the liberal agenda of justice in ways that are 
more efficient and decentralized than those liberals 
have recently depended on. This means paying atten-
tion to many of the suggestions put forward by conser-
vative and mainstream economists, who generally have 
a keen eye for efficiency and decentralization. The old 
liberal policies aimed at securing justice have in many 
cases fallen short of what they were intended to achieve. 
I, for one, do not believe that a more equal education 
for urban children will be realized by sinking more 
funds into the present urban school system or by taking 
it further into the orbit of federal funding and control. 
Why not, for example, modify the voucher system pro-
posed by Milton Friedman so that it is biased toward 
the poor? In selected urban areas we should give the 
parent(s) of impoverished children education vouchers 
worth 150 per cent of their education for use either at 
public or private elementary schools. Catholic and Lu-
theran schools would quickly arrange education for the 
poor in ways that public schools do not, thus providing 
real competition for the public education monopoly. 
At the same time the parochial schools would become 
financially viable and would tap the idealism of many 
young teachers who want to help the poor but who also 
want to teach in small schools with a modicum of dis-
cipline and moral cohesion. 
Many more examples of the combination of liberal 
ends with conservative means could be explored in 
areas such as medical care, energy, ecology, income 
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maintenance, and worker retrammg. (Incidentally, 
Gary Hart's notion of an individual retraining account 
to which both employer and employee would contri-
bute over the years is a fine neoliberal response to the 
possible prospect of redundant workers and industries.) 
These approaches would generally entail a fuller use of 
the private sector- both profit and non-profit- in pur-
suing justice in ways that are more efficient and de-
centralized. 
While I grant that conservatives and neoconservatives 
would heartily agree with my neoliberal first plank, 
i .e., affirmation of the market economy, they would be 
much less comfortable with the second. For neoconser-
vatives are conservatives; they are more likely to opt 
for the known status quo than for the unknown effects 
of government activism. Therefore, they tend to be re-
active rather than active, answering constructive pro-
posals with so many qualifications and objections that 
little initiating gets done. 
This reluctance to initiate flows from a variety of 
apprehensions, all of which I respect but with which I 
do not fully agree. Conservatives tend to believe that 
government has encroached on too many areas of life 
already, and they resist further ventures. Some believe 
liberalism does not allow for luck, fate, or the creative 
role that risk-taking plays in any society. Others believe 
that liberals are trying to change things that cannot be 
changed. Still others believe that government always 
botches what it undertakes, and winds up with results 
opposite to what it intended. Whatever the partial va-
lidity of these hesitancies , it remains the case that Amer-
ican society has moved on and improved the lot of many 
of its more vulnerable persons, and with little thanks 
to conservatives. 
It is very important to have persons of a conservative 
temperament in government and society, but it is even 
more important to have people who make constructive 
proposals in response to serious problems. Conserva-
tives and neoconservatives are in the former group; neo-
liberals are in the latter, pursuing the liberal agenda 
in new ways. 
The third liability of the older liberalism-its pro-
pensity toward an overly expansive notion of govern-
ment concern and competence-is more difficult to 
define and correct. I agree with neoconservatives that 
there is a growing segment of the public sector-some-
times called the "new class"- that has a vested interest 
in government intervention and expansion and there-
fore generates a "victim" industry in our society. The 
old liberalism as well as the churches are often sitting 
ducks for that industry. At bottom much of this hyper-
intervention derives from an implicit commitment to 
equality of condition rather than equality of oppor-
tunity. Inequality of condition for these folks automat-
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ically implies injustice. 
Neoliberals , on the contrary, believe in a fair game 
with fair rules-fair equality of opportunity. Such a 
game, neoliberals believe, will lead to more equality of 
condition than we now have, but they see little grounds 
for government to fix outcomes. Thus, neoliberals 
eschew quotas and notions of "comparable worth ." Neo-
conservatives join neoliberals on those issues , but are 
much less likely to support fair equality of opportunity, 
i.e. , compensatory treatment to get disadvantaged per-
sons closer to the same starting line as the non-disad-
vantaged in the race for genuinely open positions. 
The fourth liability of the older left-liberalism of the 
Kennedy-McGovern wing of the Democratic Party is 
being vigorously addressed by the ascendant Mondale-
Ferraro faction. It made every effort to present itself 
at this year's Convention as the epitome of patriotism, 
wholesome family life , and religious commitment. It 
remains to be seen whether the pressure of militant gays, 
feminists, unilateralists , and secularists will surface 
again to dash this attempted affirmation of mainstream 
values. 
At any rate, neoliberals-and I really can't see any 
sharp distinction from neoconservatives on this score-
do not want to see an American public ethic shaped by 
the sole principle of free consent. Implicit in the left's 
rush toward inclusion of "alternative life-styles" is a 
moral relativism that is very chilling indeed. There 
seem to exist no parameters except what persons freely 
prefer. This leads to what Richard John Neuhaus calls 
the "naked public square," a public ethos bereft of moral 
and religious legitimation . 
Regarding foreign policy, the neoliberalism I would 
like to identify myself with has a firm , unabashed com-
mitment to America's interest and cause in the world , 
and is willing to use American power, including mili-
tary power, to pursue them. America has an interest in 
maintaining a stable geopolitical balance which totali-
tarian regimes threaten to undo. But we also have a 
cause- to encourage and support the democratic pro-
ject wherever and whenever we can . There are of course 
limits in our ability to further democratic reform, but 
that cause gives us a positive, constructive intention in 
the world. 
Neoconservatives tend to build around a negative 
principle: anti-communism. This leads them to see too 
many conflicts as simply illustrations of East-West con-
flict. It also makes them too friendly toward right-wing 
authoritarian regimes and therefore too reluctant to 
support vigorous democratic reform in those countries. 
The conservative attitude toward the Marcos govern-
ment in the Philippines is a case in point. 
On the other hand, too many left-liberals are infected 
by the myth of American guilt. Whatever is wrong in 
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the world , in their view, is the result of the unjust exer-
cise of American power. This leads them to a left-wing 
isolationism that is extremely dangerous for America 
and its friends. Unfortunately, Gary Hart falls under 
this stricture. His campaign utterances seemed to assure 
the world that we had no interests in it worth defending. 
Neoliberals believe accommodation can be reached 
with the USSR, Cuba, China, etc. , but must be done 
within the context of American firmness and strength. 
Marxist-Leninists yield only when they have something 
to gain from yielding; they do not pay for services al-
ready rendered. Neoliberals are convinced of the con-
tinuity involved in deterrence strategies, rather than 
the discontinuity associated with neoconservative views, 
which posit a terribly dang·erous window of vulnerabil-
ity which we have frantically to patch up. Neoliberals 
also avoid the discontinuity involved among those lib-
erals who tend toward unilateralist impulses fueled by 
the notion of American guilt, i.e. , that we have insti-
gated the arms race. 
I rest my case. I believe the distinction between the 
two "neo's" is enough to make a difference, even if it is. 
only a way of distinguishing between groups who want 
to inhabit a creative center in American politics. Amer-
ican liberalism is worth reforming; it is also possible to 
reform. Those beliefs make me a neoliberal rather than 
a neoconservative. 
Ride Your Fine Nag 
Ride my rhyme horse with the meter-free hair 
Ride ride 0 
Together we'll poet 
Hey high 0 
Wide to the fume of the word-laving tides 
we'll ride 
to side with the scream 
dream with the horse 
while we carve up the 'i's 
demolish the nays 
Poem my pride ride your fine nag 
though it catch in the hair of the hag of the spire 






OF SMALL DIFFERENCES 
A Response to Robert Benne 
Bob Benne thinks he has a quarrel with me, and may-
be, if he pushes our marginal disagreements to their 
limits, he can find one. He will have to work hard at it 
though. I would not claim that neoconservatism and 
neoliberalism cannot be distinguished from one an-
other, but I think that he will find me a more congenial 
political companion (however cranky) than any of his 
erstwhile friends in the liberal community. The political 
world of neoliberalism (at least as described by Mr. 
Benne) holds far more in common with neoconservatism 
(at least as I understand it) than with contemporary 
liberalism. If Mr. Benne doubts this, he might reflect 
for a moment on who liked his book on democratic 
capitalism and who did not. 
Mr. Benne seems afflicted by the same obsession that 
possessed many of the original neoconservatives in the 
late Sixties and early Seventies : the insistence, above 
all else, that proprietary rights to the liberal label not 
be relinquished. One can understand that obsession. In 
the intellectual world, identification with liberalism is 
the natural and preferred condition. To be thought a 
conservative of any kind-even worse, to announce one-
self as a conservative-ranks in attractiveness with a 
reputation for attachment to the occult. It is considered 
rather peculiar; it needs explanation. No one in the 
academic community ever has to explain why he is a 
liberal. And better neo than nothing. 
But custom has a way of imposing itself, even among 
intellectuals. After years of insisting that they ought 
properly to be called neoliberals, political intellectuals 
like Norman Podhoretz and Midge Deeter came re-
luctantly to accept that the nomenclature controversy 
had been lost, that the liberal world was closed to them, 
James Nuechterlein is Editor ofThe Cresset and Associate 
Professor of Political Science at Valparaiso University. 
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and that they were stuck, like it or not, with the neocon-
servative label. 
Bob Benne, I suspect, will meet a similar fate. His 
views seem to me considerably at odds with those of a 
Gary Hart or a Paul Tsongas, with that group of Atari 
Democrats who have added a high-tech gloss to their 
traditional liberalism and who have appropriated the 
neoliberal category for themselves. Mr. Benne may con-
tinue to resist inclusion among the neoconservatives. 
Fair enough. But given the awkwardness with which 
he fits any of the varieties of liberalism, he will then 
wind up having to invent a separate political designa-
tion for himself. Life could get lonely. 
The political world of neoliberalism 
holds far more in common with 
neoconservatism than it does 
with contemporary liberalism. 
When we move from the abstractions of labels to the 
specifics of policy, we see that Mr. Benne's differences 
with neoconservatism are not so great as he supposes. 
In fact, as he spells out his disagreements with current 
liberalism, he makes a case and lays out a program with 
which most of the neoconservatives I know would have 
little quarrel. In his four-point critique of liberal do-
mestic policy weaknesses (and his own counterpro-
posals), Mr. Benne admits to a number of agreements 
with neoconservatives; and in order to establish a mea-
sure of distance from them, he has to elide some im-
portant conservative/neoconservative distinctions. 
Mr. Benne concedes that neoconservatives agree with 
his sympathy for traditional values related to patrio-
tism, family life , and religious commitment. He notes 
that this year's Democratic convention tried earnestly-
! would say desperately-to reclaim those attachments 
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for liberalism, but it seems clear that they are the more 
natural property of the Right than of the Left. The ad-
versary culture has firm roots in the liberal community, 
and the Mondale-Ferraro attempt to disguise that real-
ity can be at best only modestly persuasive. Compare, 
for example, the platforms of the two parties on such 
issues as abortion, gay rights, school prayer, and de-
fense of the national interest as the foundation of for-
eign policy. 
Mr. Benne also concedes that neoconservatives have 
fewer reservations than do liberals concerning support 
of a competitive market economy. It is true that Mr. 
Mondale inserted a good word for the private sector 
in his speech accepting the nomination, but that refer-
ence was striking precisely for its impression of novelty 
at a Democratic convention . Liberals do not reject cap-
italism, but they very seldom have anything positive 
to say about it either. Their defense of a market econ-
omy characteristically has about it a grudging and high-
ly qualified character. Neoconservatives, by contrast, 
defend democratic capitalism as essential to the Amer-
ican proposition. 
On the related question of liberalism's "propensity 
toward an overly expansive notion of government con-
cern and competence," Mr. Benne attributes to neo-
conservatives a more timid position than they in fact 
hold. Neoliberals, he says, object to modern liberal-
ism's endless generation of new classes of "victims" and 
its increasing tendency to emphasize equality of condi-
tion over equality of opportunity. Yet, he argues , neo-
liberals want to ensure fair equality of opportunity, and 
this sympathy toward compensatory treatment for the 
disadvantaged distinguishes them from neoconserva-
tives. 
It is not clear just what Mr. Benne has in mind here. 
He explicitly excludes quotas and theories of compara-
ble worth from his notion of legitimate compensatory 
treatment, and one wonders what acceptable methods 
of compensation he might favor that neoconservatives 
supposedly would oppose. Since most neoconservatives 
explicitly reject the doctrine of laissez-faire and a num-
ber of them have indicated their support for non-quota 
aid to the disadvantaged, it seems that on this issue Mr. 
Benne is indeed conjuring a distinction without a dif-
ference. 
Mr. Benne makes his most plausible case for a neo-
liberal/neoconservative distinction when he lays claim • 
for neoliberalism to the traditional liberal concern for 
"inclusion of the newcomers, the have-nots, and the 
excluded" into the mainstream of American life. If, in 
his view, the liberal reform agenda has in recent years 
too often depended on statist and inefficient schemes, 
it has at least maintained its passion for justice, and it 
is that passion he finds lacking in neoconservatism and 
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wants to keep alive. Neoconservatives, he says, have 
so many reservations about affirmative government 
that they seldom come up with constructive proposals 
for improving the lot of those least able to make it on 
their own in American society. They lack imagination 
and initiative, and their preoccupation with the falli-
bilities of government leaves them captive to the com-
placencies of the status quo. 
This is not a trivial argument, but neither is it fully 
persuasive. It is true that neoconservatism, which orig-
inated in a reaction against the perceived excesses of 
the Left, retains a lively sense of the dangers of utopian-
ism and the limits of politics. It shares with traditional 
conservatism a certain philosophical skepticism toward 
ambitious schemes of social reconstruction. Conserva-
tism finds its essence in a sense of humility before God 
and history, and that sense of humility, cultivated too 
well, can lapse into a failure of social imagination. 
But it is important to note here the distinctions be-
tween conservatives and neoconservatives. Neocon-
servatives, like neoliberals of Mr. Benne's persuasion, 
are anti-statist without being anti-government. They 
do not share the secret desire of much of American 
conservatism that government might find a way of going 
out of business. Nor have they been as unimaginative 
as Mr. Benne suggests in proposing solutions to social 
problems. The pages of The Public Interest, a neocon-
servative journal, have been filled with novel social de-
signs and investigations, and Irving Kristol, the co-
editor of The Public Interest and the most prominent 
figure in the neoconservative movement, has written 
often of a "conservative welfare state" that would em-
ploy precisely the blend of "liberal ends with conserva-
tive means" that Mr. Benne urges on us. Neoconserva-
tism, in other words, may not be as self-consciously 
preoccupied with the condition of the marginal mem-
bers of society as neoliberalism, but it is not indifferent 
to their fate and it may in practice be able to address 
their difficulties more usefully than many of those lib-
erals (I would not here include Mr. Benne) who wear 
their concern for "the poor and oppressed" so ostenta-
tiously on their sleeves. 
If we turn to Mr. Benne's views on foreign policy, we 
see a pattern similar to that on domestic issues. Here 
again he stakes out a position to the right of contempo-
rary liberalism but distinguishable, he thinks, from 
neoconservatism. But, as before, he seems to me to be 
straining in his efforts to distance himself from the neo-
conservative community. 
Neoconservatives share his strong commitment to 
defense of American interests in the world, and, like 
him, they recognize that such defense must include the 
willingness, where necessary, to employ military power. 
They also share his rejection of the myth of American 
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guilt and the tendency to left-wing isolationism that 
flows from it and that now is a dominant force in the 
Democratic party. Note how even Walter Mondale, 
who likes to imagine himself a foreign policy realist, 
has consistently been forced by liberal pressures within 
his own party to retreat from any position where the 
threat of force might seriously be contemplated. Con-
sider Grenada: no liberal administration would have 
acted as decisively-and with such positive and wel-
comed results for the Grenadian people-as the Reagan 
Administration did. Finally, neoconservatives also 
agree with Mr. Benne that accommodations with com-
munist regimes can only be reached within a context of 
American firmness and strength. 
Where, then, reside neoliberal/neoconservative dis-
tinctions? Mr. Benne thinks that neoconservatives are 
too narrowly anti-communist, too friendly toward right-
wing authoritarian regimes, and too much concerned 
with presumed vulnerabilities in the American defense 
posture. With some neoconservatives some of the time, 
perhaps so, but not with most of them most of the time. 
And even where neoliberal/neoconservative differ-
ences do exist, we are again speaking of disagreements 
at the margin, not at the heart of things. 
Most neoconservatives I know see communism as the 
greatest single threat to American interests and values 
in the world, but they do not see it as the only one. Sim-
ilarly, they share Mr. Benne's preference for democratic 
over authoritarian regimes, but they know that on some 
occasions alliance with an authoritarian government 
friendly to U.S. interests constitutes- at least in the 
short run-the least bad alternative. If they hesitate to 
put too much pressure on the Marcos government in 
the Philippines, it is not because they favor repression 
but because they remember the Shah in Iran. As for the 
matter of deterrence, I share Mr. Benne's skepticism 
about any great "window of vulnerability," and I do not 
think that doing so excludes me from membership in 
reasonably good standing in the neoconservative com-
munity. 
In· terms of substance, of course, it does not matter if 
Mr. Benne prefers to call himself a neoliberal (or a neo-
vegetarian, for that matter) rather than a neoconserva-
tive. Names do not necessarily signify. But it does mat-
ter that he understand that, whatever designation he 
prefers, the views he holds are closer to those held by 
people commonly known as neoconservatives than to 
those held by people commonly known as liberals. 
What Mr. Benne's neoliberalism shares with neo-
conservatism- and what distinguishes both of them 
from contemporary liberalism-is a highly positive 
valuation of American values and institutions. Neo-
conservatives and neoliberals alike believe in the sys-
tem of democratic capitalism and in the traditional 
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moral values that undergird it; in foreign affairs they 
see no fundamental contradiction between support of 
American national interests and pursuit of a humane 
international order. Liberals, by contrast, have adopted 
an adversarial- or at best skeptical- stance toward 
their nation's pattern of political economy at home and 
its pursuit of the national interest abroad. 
I would propose, in conclusion, that my friend Bob 
Benne perform a mental experiment. Let him imagine 
himself presenting his political and economic views to 
two different audiences, one composed of a representa-
tive range of American liberals, the other of a similar 
group of American conservatives. From which audience 
does he suspect-does he surely in his heart of hearts 
know- he would receive the more sympathetic response? 
And then let him decide if it is really so important that 
he be known as a neoliberal rather than a neoconserva-
tive. 
To Saint Teresa 
What wild traffic of life 
-a quarter million geese 
lifting off the marshes flying north-
pulled up through your veins 
while you held firm to earth, 
dear tender, dear ravished Teresa? 
To what reed did you cling 
at the tearing of your veins, 
at the boring, through every pore, 
of firey beaks and burning wings? 
How did you pray when their chatter 
bumped your heart, 
and fluttered in your brain? 
And how, when the sharp pain of their release 
sang through the hollows of your spine? 
Who pressed damp cloths against your eyes, 
who caught your sighs, revived you, 
when it was over and the land 
lay dark and sodden once again? 
And where is now your dwelling p lace 
sweet wise, sweet bride, Teresa? 
Ruth El Saffar 




Prophecy, Ethics, and the Nuclear Peril 
The cinema of nuclear holocaust, as any fan can tell 
you, has already in its short history established distinct 
subgenres. On the one hand are films like On The Beach 
and the recent Testament and The Day After, in which 
the protagonists are common people and the story one 
of human endurance, or lack thereof. A nuclear strate-
gist might call these "post-attack scenarios"; as a group 
they constitute the Cinema of Victims. (The Day After 
gave equal time to pre- and post-attack phases, but as 
the title suggests, the first part was mainly a setup.) On 
the other hand are "pre-attack" stories, which focus on 
events that could lead to war and feature the doings of 
generals and Presidents; this group could be called the 
Cinema of Perpetrators. In it belong the recent hit War-
Games and the TV movie World War Ill, together with 
the twenty-year-old classics Fail-Safe and Dr. Strangelove: 
Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. 
Pre-attack stories naturally tend to be more concerned 
with the causes, both superficial and underlying, of 
nuclear apocalypse. This being so, a Poetics of world 
destruction could further group the films by the theo-
ries they imply about these causes. On the one hand are 
Fail-Safe and World War Ill, the "agonized-President" 
stories, in which the focus is on diplomatic efforts aimed 
at averting a war that accident (Fail-Safe) or misunder-
standing (World War Ill) threatens to start. On the other 
hand are John Badham's WarGames and Stanley Kub-
rick's Dr. Strangelove, the "machine-out-of-control" (or 
frantic-President) stories, in which the focus is on efforts 
to reign in the system itself. This sub-sub-genre implies 
that nuclear catastrophe would not occur out of "mere" 
misunderstanding or accident. (To speak of "accidental" 
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catastrophe with 50,000 deliberately built warheads in 
the world is a bit crazy anyway, like saying, "I was pour-
ing kerosene all over my house and accidentally burned 
it down.") 
Given this premise, it is interesting that WarGames 
and Strangelove were perhaps the most commercially 
successful theatrical films of the whole holocaust genre. 
By positing an inherent problem in the war machine 
itself, these films have the most to say on the questions 
that should and do preoccupy us politically: how we 
got into the nuclear predicament, precisely what sort 
of predicament it is , and how, therefore, we might get 
out of it. Comparing them, while also looking over 
some recent, more philosophical attempts to grasp the 
problem, throws light on the historic debates that we 
are forced by the Bomb to encounter anew. 
I 
The "serious" adventure tale central to WarGames 
obviously differs in tone from Strangelove's ironic satire, 
but this by itself doesn't make clear the films' differing 
perspectives. If anything, the more sober viewpoint be-
longs to the black-comic Strangelove. Like all pre-attack 
stories, both films center on event at the high levels of 
command. In WarGames David , a teenage computer 
whiz, "hacks" into the North American Air Defense 
(NORAD) computer and starts a nuclear-war-game 
countdown that the computer mistakes for the real thing. 
In Strangelove a deranged Air Force officer, Jack D. 
Ripper, launches a nuclear squadron toward Russia in 
response to what he imagines are Communist plots to 
impurify his "precious bodily fluids" by fluoridating 
water. The President and his staff chiefs then discover 
they don't know the "recall code" and that the bombers 
will trigger a Russian "doomsday machine." 
WarGames, however, frequently returns us to people 
and places in the real world-parents, suburbs, David's 
bedroom at home-as though underscoring that the 
problem is in the high command, not here. Strangelove 
never shows such an "everyday" world beyond the stif-
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ling interiors of War Rooms and B-52s. The lack of a 
"normal" world free of the high command's hysteria 
forces our attention to what's wrong with the people 
themselves. If WarGames embeds NORAD in the real 
world and keeps the two distinct, Strangelove embeds 
the whole world in the angular confines of the Strategic 
Air Command. 
Strangelove similarly blurs WarGames ' sharp distinc-
tions between reality and games, and machines and 
people. Problems arise in WarGames only when games 
are confused with reality, as they are by the computer 
and its inhuman way of "thinking." In Strangelove the 
ODly r"eality we see revolves around the "game" of nu-
clear preparedness, and the machine that threatens man 
is this whole system, including bomber, crew, "threat 
boards," posturing generals, and incompetent states-
men. Again we are forced inside the people to probe 
their symbiosis with their tools, a symbiosis epitomized 
by the figure of Dr. Strangelove, who handles his wheel-
chair more capably than his own fist. 
By keeping the distinctions sharp, WarGames exter-
nalizes the threat. It implies that something essential to 
man lies outside the ominous system. This human qual-
ity is represented by David and his competence, which 
is what saves mankind from its manufactured Goliaths. 
Since the competent are also the good (one becomes 
capable by being serious, humble, and chaste), skill will 
always serve, never oppose, other values. For all its 
late-model hardware, WarGames is really the old Amer-
ican outlaw myth. David wins the right to ignore the 
mundane rules, security systems, and politics of his 
machine-ridden world because he knows that world the 
way movie detectives know city streets and movie cow-
boys know shortcuts to the pass. We welcome his raids 
on it because we trust that his purposes are ours too. 
David's mastery allows him to "re-educate" the NORAD 
computer, proving that machines can be humanized if 
they're turned over to adolescents, computer "nerds," 
or other genuine human beings. David saves civiliza-
tion from itself by staking out for human values the 
wild and woolly microchip frontier. 
WarGames says, Machines can be like people: We're 
saved. Strangelove says, People are too much like ma-
chines: We're doomed. In Strangelove's world, compe-
tence, as Thoreau put it, is as likely to serve the devil, 
without intending it, as God. Competence built and 
serves the machines, which take on a life of their own. 
Bomber commander "King" Kong's good ol' Yankee 
know-how just hastens disaster by getting the bomb-
bay doors unstuck. No one in this world has an overall 
grasp of things like David's, and in any case there is no 
room for outlaws: Major Kong's Cowboys-and-Indians 
approach to "nucl'ar combat" just looks ridiculous. An 
open, frontier-like realm of human mastery and free-
October, 1984 
dom is not to be found on blinking blue screens any 
more than on the ruddy horizon. 
Finally, if WarGames unselfconsciously appropriates 
American myths, Strangelove very deliberately uses old 
movie conventions to attack such myths. The B-52's 
flight toward Russia builds suspense the same way old 
World War II flicks used to, suggesting that what the 
nuclear army does is an extension of what armies have 
always done-and that's just the problem. Eventually 
these old-movie conventions are turned back against 
us, inasmuch as they have us hoping that the plane will 
get through. They make even our real real world com-
plicit in the destruction of the world on screen. 
II 
One might not expect this from Hollywood, but these 
two popular films differ as they do by virtue of re-
enacting an ancient controversy of Western culture. 
Their differing views of the Bomb derive from sharply 
differing views of human nature, views which- borrow-
ing from Geoffrey Aggeler's essays on Anthony Bur-
gess, whose novels have inspired other work of Stanley 
Kubrick's-we might label the "Pelagian" and the "Aug-
ustinian." These terms are a tribute to the debate's 
classic expression, the fifth-century argument between 
Pelagius, the British monk, and St. Augustine, the great 
Church Father, over the question of original sin. As 
Aggeler points out, that argument, secularized and 
applied to social and political questions, has continued 
throughout our history, with the Pelagian belief in 
human perfectibility on earth echoed by "humanists" 
like Rousseau and Thomas Paine, and the Augustinian 
insistence on man's weakness and fallen state reasserted 
by Hobbes, Edmund Burke, and other so-called "con-
servatives" (though where contemporary issues are 
involved terms like "liberal" and "conservative" are 
confusing). 
WarGames' belief in a human spirit apart from the 
war machine is clearly Pelagian. It reminds one of the 
faith in an "unqualified rule of Mind" that historian 
Hiram Haydn attributes to the Renaissance humanists. 
By comparison, Strangelove takes the Augustinian posi-
tion that there is no way to separate the human spirit 
from its works, and that humanity's predicament today 
is historically continuous with its past-the humanistic 
belief in progress is an illusion. All this depends on 
seeing the rule of Mind, and Mind itself, as radically 
qualified. Mind somehow negates itself, and given this 
view, Strangelove's ending becomes a perfect negation of 
WarGames ': a beautiful dance of mushroom clouds as 
mankind erases itself. 
If two films of the same sub-genre turn out to express 
virtually opposite points of view, so the recent writings 
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of two philosophers of disarmament, though they even-
tually come around to similar conclusions, also differ 
surprisingly in terms of this fundamental debate. On 
the one hand lies The Fate of the Earth by Jonathan 
Schell (Knopf and Avon, 1982) and Schell's newly pub-
lished sequel, The Abolition (Knopf, 1984). On the other 
lies Freeman Dyson's Weapons and Hope (Harper and 
Row, 1984). These works illuminate each other, and 
especially by contrasting the broad perspectives offered 
by Weapons and Hope and The Fate of the Earth (which 
both originated as New Yorker magazine serials), we 
derive new ways of looking at the nuclear problem. 
The purpose of The Fate of the Earth is the same as 
that which Aggeler attributes to Pelagius: a desire to 
awaken mankind from a "sinful indolence" that is held 
to be the problem of the age. In Schell's view this in-
dolence results from the Bomb, which thus is presented 
as a radically new thing in history, a "revolution" in 
human affairs comparable to man's Fall from Grace. 
By inventing the Bomb, we have "eaten more deeply of 
the fruit of the tree of knowledge," changed the funda-
mental human condition, and enlarged our power to 
the point at which it now threatens "both history and 
biology." And this threat is permanent, since "a basic 
scientific finding," like nuclear chain reactions , "has 
the character of destiny for the world." 
Schell worries not just that a sizable nuclear exchange 
could extinguish mankind, but also that by mortally 
threatening the human future we undercut the source 
of meaning and value for our lives in the present. That 
source, he says, is what Hannah Arendt called the 
"common world," or essentially culture. To save the 
future , the common world, and the meaning of exist-
ence, we must "reinvent politics" and find a global solu-
tion to the peril. 
Notions of a basically self-defeating quality over-
arching human experience sound Augustinian. But in 
fact, from an Augustinian view, Schell's assumptions 
merit a searching critique, beginning with his belief 
that the problem is new and, indeed, arises from the 
rule of Mind. Schell's notion of a "second fall" dis-
counts the significance of the first Fall, which, whatever 
one thinks of Genesis as history, is a key event for any 
Augustinian analysis. To an Augustinian one bite of 
the apple was enough, and ever since man has needed 
saving from his own will. 
Short such a view, Schell leaves open such questions 
as why scientific knowledge is destiny, and why it 
chooses to endanger the knower. Though justifiable, it 
is essentially humanistic to worry that while human 
beings once lived in some sort of harmony with natural 
law, they have suddenly become "actors in the geologi-
cal time span." The Augustinian would be inclined to 
theorize about why man's "judgments, moods, and de-
12 
cisions" loom up so "terrifying" before nature. 
Related questions apply to Schell's idea of the com-
mon world as "the great edifice by which individual 
death is overcome," man is allowed to "imagine a future 
beyond his own life," and man's works are saved from 
"the natural ruin of time." (Any place humanity isn't-
the deep past, the threatened future-Schell calls "dark-
ness.") From an Augustinian viewpoint, this makes the 
common world an outgrowth of the Fall and a device 
for maintaining the human will to power transcending 
nature. Thus it actually implicates the common world 
in our threatened second fall-which therefore ceases 
to be a "second" fall. 
The purpose of The Fate of the Earth 
is the same as that attributed to 
Pelagius: a desire to awaken 
mankind from its "sinful indolence." 
In The Fate of the Earth, biological existence, culture, 
and scientific mastery in the abstract (recall WarGames) 
stand apart from the "judgments, moods, and decisions" 
that give us the Bomb. Hence the book calls for con-
serving what is fundamentally human (the common 
world) over against any "particular standard, goal, or 
ideology" that we might be tempted to treat as the "sum" 
of all existence. But it could be argued that mankind 
has scarcely done anything but treat partial, temporal 
ideologies as cosmic sums of existence, and that bio-
logical life and culture have routinely gone by the 
boards in the process (as Schell himself hints in remarks 
on genocide) . 
National sovereignty, the system Schell correctly 
sees as the root of the nuclear terror, is in this view 
simply the latest in a long line of such ideologies. In 
this book Schell cannot engage the sovereignty problem 
because he believes that government arose in the first 
place for human betterment, rather than as an instru-
ment of exploitation, class dominance, Oedipal trauma, 
or what have you. Hence it remains a puzzle that sov-
ereign nations today threaten mutual annihilation to 
stay sovereign . The Bomb itself Schell looks to as cause 
rather than consequence of the "ludicrous" failure of 
politics "even to aim at the basic goals that have tra-
ditionally justified its existence." 
Ultimately Schell does not deal . with the fact that 
ideologies are themselves products of the common world 
and part of the human effort to "mean" that he values 
so highly. To live "meaningfully," rather than just live, 
may be essentially human, but paradoxically it's just 
the creature that "means" that's willing to see its whole 
race die. Meanings are the symbolic links by which one's 
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personal existence is tied to a perceived (in fact, com-
mon) world. Therefore, meanings are what let the crea-
ture believe that without me, the world means nothing, 
and therefore is nothing, and might as well cease to be. 
Holocaust is hardly, as the cliche has it, "unthinkable": 
just the opposite. The great value of Schell's humanism 
is its effort to persuade a modern public that should 
know better that, practically speaking, there are no 
meanings left once we're all dead. (The fact that, im-
practically speaking, many of us might still attach mean-
ing to the destruction itself is a problem addressed 
further below.) 
III 
So while the Pelagian view sees the Bomb as a gigantic, 
perhaps tragic, error, a by-product of misplaced reliance 
on certain meanings, it is also possible to see it as cen-
tral to the whole historic mission of mankind to mean. 
Instead of representing, as Schell puts it, the mere fail-
ure of "consciousness and will," nuclear weapons in this 
view stand as the positive, desired achievement of a con-
sciousness and will that are radically flawed. Schell 
denies that we "love the Bomb," a Ia Strangelove. He is 
aware of claims that "innate" human violence and a 
"territorial imperative" require for all time a system 
of nuclear-armed states. But he rejects such ideas of 
"some dark and ineluctable truth in the bottom of our 
souls," and instead calls on us to "delve to the bottom 
of the world" for a global political solution, like world 
government. 
"Territorial imperative" is a reference to the best-
selling pop-anthropology of Robert Ardrey, another 
author much admired, not coincidentally, by Stanley 
Kubrick. Among other things , Ardrey's books attacked 
the notion that the nuclear problem can be solved by 
world government. But Ardrey is not a worthy oppo-
nent for Schell. His naive Augustinianism is more level 
with that of the real-life Dr. Strangeloves, those diehard 
strategist-advocates of deterrence and the nuclear stock-
pile. Kubrick's Augustinianism is more sophisticated, 
even if it, too, offers little hope. But likewise more 
sophisticated is the theory offered by Freeman Dyson 
in Weapons and Hope, the very title of which promises 
that in this book hope is not excluded. 
Dyson's analysis looks very unlike Schell's effort to 
"delve to the bottom" for unified truths about exist-
ence. Instead Dyson skims through history-which , he 
assumes, still "proceeds at its old slow pace"- in order 
to explore how "the cultural patterns of the past persist." 
This involves looking at the different meanings attached 
to the Bomb by different interest groups-warriors and 
"victims"; diplomats, pacifists, "scholar-soldiers ," 
scientists, poets , and the Russians ; arms controllers, de-
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fense advocates, and proponents of "technical follies." 
These groups are historically conceived, and the var-
ious opposing ideologies they represent long predate 
nuclear weapons. Dyson is more interested in how pres-
ent policies grow out of longstanding ways of thinking 
than he is in how ways of thinking have been remade 
by those policies. Ideas, for Dyson, are prior to tech-
nology. (Hence technology is always political. Recall 
that The Fate of the Earth asked us to transcend politics, 
and that WarGames, in line with those old American 
myths, posited an apolitical technics that could be 
apolitically mastered.) 
The theory that emerges from this analysis explains 
our peril in terms of converging dynamics. For Dyson, 
a physicist who has advised the British and American 
governments on weaponry, there is a dynamic to war-
fare, a dynamic to policymaking, and dynamics to tech-
nology, arms control, international relations , and the 
human soul. So far these dynamics have militated in 
favor of nuclear weapons, but all could also militate 
against them. For instance, in technology there is a 
good dynamic whereby defensive weapons gradually 
replace weapons of mass destruction. In international 
relations there is a bad dynamic whereby the Russians , 
following their historical experience, unwittingly scare 
us with their strategic doctrines of "first strike," and we, 
following ours, scare them in turn with tactical doc-
trines of "first use." (In Strangelove the Russians build 
their doomsday machine first out of fear of a "dooms-
day gap.") And nuclear weapons are themselves an 
equivocal dynamic in history, having inhibited world 
war at the cost of risking world destruction. 
These ironies are reminiscent of Dr. Strangelove, which 
also emphasized the equivocal nature of even positive 
human urges. Besides technical skill, there are such 
noble traits as propriety, memorably expressed in Pres-
ident Merkin Muffley's outburst, "Gentlemen! You 
can't fight in here! This is the War Room ." But as this 
irony suggests, in this world the bad tendencies over-
shadow the good. However individual relations are 
governed, institutionally it's the savage or wrongheaded 
impulses that rule. This is the essence of Strangelove's 
satire. Characters can be well-intentioned, well-
informed, or effectual, but never all three at once; they 
rely on machines that function well but only at the 
wrong times; they follow orders when the orders are 
mistaken, then take "initiative" when the right ones 
come through. 
Dyson's view isn't this bleak, but his historical tales 
do reinforce the sense that in man's collective life, at 
least, he tends to choose the worst of both worlds. Thus 
J. Robert Oppenheimer advocates small tactical weap-
ons for Europe in hopes of forestalling a crash "Super-
bomb" buildup; in the end we get the world-threatening 
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Superbomb and unstable tactical deployments that make 
its use more likely. Likewise George Kennan, a hero of 
Dyson's, argues in 1944 for a stabilizing postwar bal-
ance of power; the U.S. pursues grander schemes of 
world order (including international control of atomic 
weapons) , and when these fai l we end up with both the 
balance of power and a destabilizing arms race-a situa-
tion Dyson likens to Europe's in 1914. Today, we risk 
getting both the MX missile and a makeshift basing sys-
tem that belies the missile's original purpose and invites 
a Soviet pre-emptive attack. It's Goofus and Gallant, 
but with Gallant always just advising and Goofus mak-
ing final decisions. 
Are we condemned by the viciousness of 
our natures always to arm ourselves 
with the most vicious weapons? 
Dyson denies that "we are condemned by the vicious-
ness of our nature always to arm ourselves with the most 
vicious weapons," but we can rightly wonder why, in 
the case of Oppenheimer, Kennan, Einstein, Admiral 
Rickover, Robert McNamara, and others, lucidity about 
the peril has always seemed to correlate with a lack of 
influence on policy, and vice-versa. It does seem that 
while individuals may be wise, institutions and nations, 
and individuals as members of same, have a gift for 
turning wisdom to folly-probably all the while be-
lieving they have no other choice. (In the March 1984 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, historian Barton Bern-
stein shows that just such assumptions of powerlessness 
underlay the Truman Administration's Superbomb de-
cisions.) 
Given the historical record, Dyson speaks explicitly 
of "original sin" as a factor to be weighed in evaluating 
possible solutions. Though he uses the term narrowly, 
it highlights his Augustinian inclinations, which bring 
his analysis closer than most to uncovering the prob-
lem's psychic roots. Next to the ignorance, paranoia, 
and fatalism most authors recognize as factors, Dyson, 
perhaps surprisingly, sets fun, adventure, and beauty. 
Nuclear explosives, he has said elsewhere, "have a glit-
ter more seductive than gold to those who play with 
them." We must realize that there are military men 
"happily looking forward to the days after the SlOP 
[nuclear-war plan] is executed," just as Major Kong was 
ecstatic as he war-whooped his way to Armageddon. 
This, then, would be the really troubling "dark and 
ineluctable truth" in our souls: not the will to violence 
or some territorial imperative, but the fact that even 
our better instincts move us to "love the Bomb." 
This insight suggests a far different program than 
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does naive Augustinianism, which recognizes only the 
more overt "dark truths." Naive Augustinianism re-
quires that we surrender to the eternal need for a huge 
store of deterring armaments; it assumes that since dark 
truths created the status quo, they also dictate its per-
petuation. One reply to this is Schell's effort, which is 
to shift the burden of proof off those who favor sharp 
breaks with present policy and onto the naive Augus-
tinians, whose ranks, if by default, currently include 
almost everyone. Accomplishing the shift requires hold-
ing the peril before us and demanding that we face it 
until we have it thoroughly abolished. We might call 
this the reply of the prophet (that is, the religious-type 
prophet), since what most commentators seem to mean 
by calling The Fate of the Earth "prophetic" is its strin-
gency in calling us to political perfection. 
It is interesting that Dyson disagrees sharply with 
Schell on two points, forgetfulness and the assumption 
of survivability. Unlike Schell, Dyson sees it as a good 
thing that we can forget about nuclear weapons and go 
on about our daily lives. And unlike Schell, who thinks 
the uncertainty of mankind's surviving a nuclear war 
means assuming the apocalyptic worst, Dyson sees the 
same fact as suggesting that we take rational steps to 
limit a future war's damage (but not that we Strange-
lovianly speak of "only" twenty million deaths as "get-
ting our hair mussed"). The difference in both cases is 
the difference between prophecy and ethics. Dyson's 
reply to the naive Augustinians is that of the ethicist. 
His idea of hope, a virtue "to be practiced whether or 
not we find it easy or even natural," is an attempt at 
doing an ethics for a nuclear-armed world. Ethics takes 
a narrower view of the nuclear danger because it sees 
the world as fallen regardless of it. But conversely, it 
asserts that having fallen into the "knowledge of good 
and evil" requires, and permits, rigorous efforts to limit 
evil and choose good. 
IV 
Prophecy and ethics together attack our hopelessness, 
which rests on the arrogant notion that human power, 
by a series of individual choices, has somehow built up 
an edifice from which new choices cannot bring us back 
down. This notion makes of the Bomb a Tower of Babel 
whereby we assert that our works have come to extend 
as high as heaven. Prophecy shows us the real summit 
to be scaled and so begins the climb down from these 
vain heights, but the confessions of guilt it inspires are 
also reaffirmations of our ethical power to make new 
choices. Ethics in this sense completes the prophet's 
work. It is not surprising that Schell's new book, The 
Abolition, follows this logic to the point of also searching 
for an ethics ("a deliberate policy"), one whereby we 
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still heed the prophet's call to perfection but also "bal-
ance" it within the total framework of ·daily life. 
The Abolition reveals a crucial accretion of Augustin-
ian insights in Schell's thinking. It is sympathetic to the 
dilemmas of "political realism" that undercut his ear-
lier calls for a reinvented world, and it acknowledges 
the historical dynamics at work: The nuclear buildup 
was "apparently fuelled by a tremendous internal mo-
mentum .... Deterrence theory, it seemed, was compe-
tent to start an arms race but not to stop one." Schell 
recounts how this theory went from distasteful expe-
dient to permanent, official "dogma" even while pro-
ducing such absurdities as Euromissile deployments 
that have heightened the fears they were originally 
supposed to calm. Such "steady retrogression over the 
last thirty-nine years" leaves us in this sinful but elo-
quently rendered state: 
Through the balance of terror. we. all come to hold a dagger to the 
hearts of those nearest and dearest to us as well as to threaten those 
far away . ... Our acceptance of nuclear weapons is in that sense a 
default of parenthood. of love. of friendship . of citizenship. in which 
we all. like hijackers of airplanes . take one another hostage and 
threaten to kill one another. In acquiescing in the balance of terror . 
we become irresponsible parents. coldhearted love rs, faithless 
friends . and apathetic citizens. 
On the surface, Schell is still blaming nuclear weap-
ons for this condition; he believes our better instincts 
are truly better, and calls for a recovery of our faith, 
stolen away by the Bomb, in them and in ourselves. But 
paradoxically it is Schell's own newly acquired lack of 
humanistic faith that is the key to his new solution. The 
Fate of the Earth despaired of "a deliberate policy" be-
cause it assumed a willfulness and even a (misguided) 
rationality to having the Bomb. Schell now acknowl-
edges that, like a little child, humanity makes mischief 
not only when it wills to but sometimes just because 
there's opportunity: "It is the very existence of the ar-
senals, rather than any intention to use them, that makes 
their use possible." Sophisticated Augustinian truth is 
just this sort of insight into pointless, willy-nilly evil. 
And it suggests as an answer that we trust our abiding 
knowledge of physics to have "ruined" war in a way that 
lays the foundation for permanent peace. The "scien-
tific destiny" that gives us the Bomb, while still "a kind 
of second fall from grace," is now seen as a fortunate 
fall. 
In essence, Schell independently discovers Dyson's 
"Live and Let Live" strategy, in which existing weapons 
are treated as bargaining chips in negotiations for a 
nuclear-free but defensively armed world-a world in 
which nuclear "cheating" is deterred by eventual, not 
instant, rearmament and retaliation. Both authors con-
vincingly argue for this strategy and also stress that a 
nuclear-free world would be good not only in itself, but 
October, 1984 
also as an arena in which creative things could happen 
politically-whether in favor of world government or 
of some other final answer to the problem of war. Ulti-
mately the ethicist hopes not only that human activity 
can be spared the pointlessness in which nuclear weap-
ons drape it, but also that it can turn around and con-
vert the pointlessness of the situation into some kind of 
sense and value. 
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The relationship of prophet to ethicist is that both 
deal in something like theology. Indeed, writings on 
nuclear issues are so nearly theological that to compare 
them with fifth-century churchly disputes is scarcely 
analogy. Theology is the attempt to fathom man's rela-
tion to ultimate things. That the Bomb is an ultimate 
thing is taken for granted when we consider it merely 
as a device. As this sort of ultimate, it becomes the ob-
ject of our widely acknowledged fatalism ~nd fear, as 
well as of a style of strategic calculation that has often 
been seen to resemble the kind of "theology" that counts 
angels on pinheads. 
But considered as a symbol, the Bomb begins to 
emerge as the kind of ultimate to which we can under-
stand humanity devoting admiration and reverence 
also. From this viewpoint we can reconcile Schell's "dag-
ger" remark, and its implication that the victim/perpe-
trator distinction is false, with Dyson's notion of the 
"glitter" and "fun" of nuclear weapons. Loving the 
Bomb involves us all, for several reasons which to some 
extent doubtless touch others besides Americans: 
l) The psychological appeal of the weapons themselves. 
This includes, first, the fun of knowing about something 
and getting good at using it. Weapons have always 
offered this, and the offer is enhanced by sophisticated 
weapons or sophisticated ideas, like nuclear physics, 
on which weapons are based. Second, it includes the 
"game" quality of warfare. Strangelove suggests that 
military men are frustrated little boys who never quit 
playing Cops and Robbers. ( WarGames denies this and 
inverts the point by focusing on the serious grown man 
to be found in the boy once he realizes that his games 
cause trouble.) 
Actually Strangelove goes further, suggesting that the 
real thrill of nuclear war is perversely sexual, a "strange 
love." The crazed officer thinks his sexual responses 
are a Communist plot; Dr. Strangelove salaciously en-
visions an underground human remnant "servicing" 
leaders like himself; Major Kong's warhead becomes a 
giant phallus as he rides it to doom waving his cowboy 
hat. (This last image is unwittingly echoed by a real-
life, defense-industry "sales" film for the U.S. cruise 
missile excerpted in a 1980 60 Minutes television seg-
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ment. The missile, nicknamed "Tomahawk," is seen in 
awesome forward thrust to the absurd accompaniment 
of theme music reminiscent of Indian war drums.) Even 
WarGames unconsciously assents to this point in re-
verse. If Strangelove's antiheroes bring the bedroom to 
the War Room, WarGames 'serious hero spurns girls for 
a bedroom full of gadgets. Human power saves the 
world when "purified" of sex as well as politics, just as 
in Strangelove sexually confused human power causes 
the world to blow up. 
2) The symbolic appeal of nuclear destruction. In Strange-
love the end of the world is presented as a lovely sight. 
Kubrick seems to suggest that this is how we view it 
anyway. The idea of a glorious moral Judgment Day 
has deep roots in our cu lture, as even Schell affirms, 
though he thinks it a threat instead of a promise and 
therefore assumes horror on our part at the evidence 
that nuclear war could destroy mankind. Yet even secu-
lar man may fear the bang less than the whimper, and 
prefer one to nothing at all. Historian Perry Miller, 
in his essay "The End of the World ," tells of the dismay 
of Western philosophers, including Newton himself, 
in the face of seventeenth-century Newtonian cosmol-
ogy, which seemed to show the universe grinding away 
like clockwork forever. "A host of poets, theologians , 
pamphleteers rushed forward ," says Miller, "to prove 
that catastrophe was still possible." Newton took up 
researches in the book of Revelation while some others 
hung their hopes on Halley's Comet. Today we trust 
neither doom , so it has been necessary to invent one. 
As the very existence of WarGames attests, nuclear 
weapons routinely fit themselves into old molds of cul-
tural myth and desire. A detailed discussion of this 
phenomenon is Ira Chernus' "The Symbolism of the 
Bomb" (Christian Century, Oct. 12, 1983). Chernus cor-
rectly argues that disarmament efforts must be carried 
to the level of symbolism, where the Bomb "echoes" 
Christianity's promise of "omnipotent power breaking 
into world history, assuring future existence through 
death and resurrection." Chern us' specific proposal , 
though, is that we try to reorient this symbolism by link-
ing nuclear destruction with images of hell and disarm-
ament with images of heaven, so that the "saving jour-
ney" becomes "a political as well as spiritual act," name-
ly disarmament. 
Leaving aside the merits of conflating the political 
and spiritual, it is easy to see that this particular pro-
posal won't work. The disarmed world is a Pelagian 
dream, and heavenly salvation an Augustinian one. The 
former defeats apocalypse instead of being achieved by 
it, and hence does nothing to fulfill the Augustinian 
yearning. Chernus thus offers as an answer what is really 
the original problem, just as Schell , self-defeatingly in 
this view, elevates a worldly achievement (the nuclear 
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stockpile) into a cosmic event (the second fall of man). 
It shows how little the prevailing humanism has reaped 
from this fertile field that so recent and sound a dis-
cussion as Chernus' should undercut itself this way. 
3) The problem of needing to "mean." Already dis-
cussed. This is the general case of #1 and #2. It is what 
makes the end of the world potentially less frightening 
(contra Schell) than the prospect of leaving the world 
individually in death. It is also the source of all sym-
bolism, hence of all refusals to place life above other 
concerns. (Only a symbol-user has other concerns.) In-
triguingly , much modern philosophy, inspired by ad-
vances in anthropology, linguistics, and Freudian psy-
chology, has come to concern itself (so far as I can make 
out) with studying symbol-systems and critiquing the 
motives , processes, and consequences of "meaning." 
These critiques may not deal explicitly with the Bomb, 
though it seems appropriate that Freud himself famous-
ly anticipated nuclear weapons in 1930 when he ex-
pressed the fear that man's "instincts" and mastery of 
nature could combine to destroy the world. 
4) The belt'ef that the U.S. can't produce anything truly 
evil. It has often been noted that high U.S. officials, like 
the one who believed "enough shovels" would save us 
all in a nuclear war, are given simply to denying the 
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threat. To explain this, Schell notes, negatively, that 
denying reality is one way around deterrence doctrine's 
logical flaws. But it may also be that such denials mask a 
positively held belief like #4. It may not matter here 
that Americans invented nuclear weapons, nor that the 
only ones so far used were American-though one 
would like to rationalize these facts. But what would 
matter is the speed and thoroughness with which the 
Bomb was assimilated within overall U.S. policy. By 
virtue of this it comes under the widespread umbrella 
of belief that U.S . aims, and the broad patterns of our 
policy, are by definition good, just, and perhaps divine-
ly sanctioned. 
5) The ideology of national sovereignty. The more gen-
eral corollary of #4. Sovereignty is an ideology because 
it sets broad patterns of thinking in people's lives. It is 
the paramount modern ideology insofar as statesmen, 
as Schell notes, "are ultimately prepared to bring an 
end to mankind in their attempt to protect their own 
countries." Basically Schell sees this fact of "protection" 
as the connection between the Bomb and the system of 
nation-states. But his remark also hints at a deeper link. 
The illogical situation he describes (not to mention the 
idiotic threat we pose to civilians who, we otherwise 
agree, are oppressed victims of the very government 
we would kill them in order to assail) is the reductio ad 
absurdum of sovereignty's essential principle. This prin-
ciple is the idea that different moral standards apply to 
nations than to persons. It is also the idea that individ-
ual persons are justified or damned by reasons of state. 
The first idea was critiqued in 1983 by the U.S. Cath-
olic bishops, the second in 1945 (as it happens) by 
Dwight Macdonald's classic essay, "The Responsibility 
of Peoples." The "animism," or attributing of personal 
qualities to states, of which Macdonald speaks is what 
permits nations to identify themselves a priori as bearers 
of justice, divine will, or the values of history , and then 
to defend this self-concept by threatening the unjust, 
godless, and history-ending slaughter of innocent mil-
lions. One's own nation becomes a quasi-religious cru-
sade, justifying everything, and one can hope to see the 
adversary, as President Reagan joked last August, "out-
lawed forever" and then "bombed," as though these 
were the same act. 
But to an animistic way of thinking, denial of another 
nation's legitimacy and physical attacks on its homeland 
are the same act. Warfare is corporal punishment, and 
the Bomb the most satisfying paddle. Hence its real 
significance. Nuclear weapons don't just physically 
guard the system of sovereignty; spiritually, they em-
body its deepest values. We must all but worship the 
State to believe as we do in the Bomb. (An anthropolo-
gist, David Mandelbaum, recently urged disarmament 
researchers to do anthropological studies of the nuclear 
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nations' "civic faiths." He seemed not to suspect that 
the object of those faiths might turn out to be the civitas 
itself.) 
The first three points above elaborate on love of the 
Bomb, the last two on love of country, the hand that 
wields the Bomb. Other writers have spoken of both 
loves, but they richly merit more sustained study, as do 
the intimate links between them. Both are "strange," 
idolatrous loves, perhaps demanding no less than col-
lective psychotherapy, and certainly the province of a 
peculiarly anxious and unhappy creature. 
Aware of this unhappiness, Dyson urges on us the 
attitude of the low comedian. "Tragedy is not our busi-
ness," and neither is redemptive comedy, in which 
tragedy is overcome by cosmic infusions of Grace. In-
stead, he counsels a nuclear-age ethic of "sagacity and 
survival." The cure for the era's malaise indeed may 
bring the whole issue off the cosmic plane, where we've 
been too ready to encounter it from the beginning. Nu-
clear weapons will cease to entail our deepest spiritual 
strivings when we rediscover how to treat them solely 
as mundane politics. 
But perhaps the main reason the nuclear-arms race 
has had such "tremendous internal momentum" is that 
nuclear weapons stand at the shared apex of two of the 
formative philosophical traditions of our culture- both 
of which, at their extremes, lead t€l a kind of nihilism 
("nihilism" being Schell's ultimate diagnosis of our 
present attitude). As Geoffrey Aggeler observes, "The 
Pelagian preoccupation with the tradition of liberty 
and the dignity of man, like the Augustinian preoccu-
pation with stability, will make any sacrifice for the good 
of man worthwhile, including the destruction of man 
himself." Both Bomb and country can simultaneously 
represent human works and transcendent power; hence 
each of the five tendencies cited above as psychic roots 
of the peril rests on both misplaced Pelagian and de-
based Augustinian faiths. (Deterrence doctrine adds a 
squalid Augustinian belief in the enemy's evil.) 
Nuclear weapons are a point of convergence for the 
two great issues of the ancient debate, human power 
and original sin. For Americans especially, they crystal-
lize and make palpable the cosmic abstraction of orig-
inal sin, and they give cosmic stature to our palpable 
belief in our own prowess. Because their abolition will 
require both recognition of our sinfulness (our wrong 
choices, and our dispirited, unhappy condition) and 
also faith in our power to act , the best responses will 
synthesize the two great traditions and show a grasp of 
the whole debate. In the end both Dyson and Schell pro-
vide such responses. They disdain the cinema's classic 
choice between sophisticated pessimism and unsophisti-
cated hope, and instead insist on sophisticated hope. 
Just to hear it spoken of is cause for reassurance. Cl 
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China in a Teacup 
Richard Lee 
Outdoors a million commuters 
ring their bicycle bells like wind 
chimes, pensioners carve the mist 
out of the April air with their 
morning exercises, and school-
children lob Frisbees and loop 
ferocious dragontail kites . Indoors 
an American tourist turns over in 
his bed in the presidential suite 
in the Diaoyutai State Guest House 
in Peking, dutifully keeping the 
sheets warm between the visits of 
Nixon and Reagan and trying to 
think some appropriately presi-
dential thoughts. 
Outside and inside it is China, 
and I rise to another spring day of 
unscrewing its inscrutables. The 
houseboy arrives with boiling water 
poured over green tea and I watch 
the sodden leaves slowly sink toward 
the bottom of the cup. 
While those leaves perfume the 
air and darken the waters my few 
presidential thoughts attain only 
to ironies. The first is the success-
ful Marxist preparation of China 
for necessary relations with capi-
talist America and the second is 
the fortunate American loss of the 
Richard Lee returns this autumn to 
Valparaiso University after a sabbatical 
in Cambridge, England, and other parts 
East last spring. 
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Vietnam war which now makes 
peace- if not the kiss of peace-
possible between America and China. 
It is probably only by traveling 
China that an American can ap-
preciate how unMarxist, even un-
Maoist, China is today. Daily life 
is more Confucian than Commu-
nist, and even where the party 
line is taken publicly something 
softens the swaggering metaphysics 
of Marxism and leaves a gentle 
shrewdness in its place. One must 
not be sentimental about the emerg-
ing China. It is very much under 
the dictatorship of an authori-
tarian party whose ideology is un-
congenial to much of Western 
liberalism. But China is hardly a 
police state, considerable freedom 
and even "private enterprise" is 
enjoyed at local levels, houses of 
worship which do not "contaminate 
the people" are open, and whatever 
social regimentation occurs seems 
more out of traditional decorum and 
economic necessity than any politi-
cal repression . China is poor but not 
impoverished, and an abundant 
supply of smiles apparently affords 
one per person. 
The most lasting Marxist influence 
in China is probably its technologi-
cal commitment. A technical ideol-
ogy breeds techniques, and tech-
niques breed technical necessities 
in what might have remained a 
feudal society. Crazy Maoism not-
withstanding , much has been 
achieved-a billion people ade-
quately fed, clothed, housed, 
schooled, and medically treated 
is no mean achievement- but much 
more remains for the doing. It is 
this technological imperative 
which opens China to the capitalist 
West. And, blessed by the loss of 
its borrowed Vietnam war, America 
can become a treaty and trading 
partner with China today. The 
Chinese I listened to were politely 
amused that America should ever 
fear China but some freely admitted 
their fear of America. A few were 
old enough to remember their 
costly border defense in the Korean 
war and most were old enough to 
remember-with a shuddering of 
shoulders-the awesome American 
military power to kill and destroy 
in neighboring Vietnam. But all 
seemed encouraged that American 
power could "only kill and destroy" 
in Vietnam but could not finally 
secure another military presence 
or proxy in Asia. 
It is , then, with subdued fears 
but also modest hopes that the 
Chinese approach new relations 
with America. While they are less 
afraid of America militarily they 
remain wary about relations with 
the West culturally. So puritan a 
society as China cannot look with 
equanimity upon the corruption 
they associate with capitalist 
America in Vietnam or for that 
matter with the West in Hong Kong. 
It remains for the Chinese to keep 
the West at bay morally while 
catching up with it technologically 
through trade with it economically. 
It is a balancing act worthy of the 
best Chinese acrobats, and I wish 
the Chinese well. 
As I write this column in April, 
the Diaoyutai is readying for Rea-
gan's arrival. His balancing act will 
be to strengthen China technolog-
ically without making a proud peo-
ple appear the pawns in the "con-
tainment of Russia"-and be as 
fuzzy as we know he can be at his 
best on the issue of Taiwan. In that 
reverse twist somersault I wish him 
well, and for his comfort delicious 
sauces are served here for Peking 
duck which might also serve for 
eating crow. 
The tea is also excellent when it 
finally steeps. I am taking mine 
into the garden to return the tea 
leaves to the good earth. If anyone 
wonders how an ordinary tourist 
got booked into the Diaoyutai, so 
do I. Perhaps in inscrutable China it 
helps if your ancient family name is 
Lee. Cl . 
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Big Shoulders 
John Steven Paul 
To see the best that Chicago thea-
tre had to offer this summer you had 
to go to New York. Last spring, the 
Steppenwolf Theatre sent Joan 
Allen and their production of C.P. 
Taylor's And a Nightingale Sang (see 
The Cresset, April, 1983) to the Vivian 
Beaumont Theatre at Lincoln Cen-
ter. That production joined Step-
penwolf's True West, which was also 
playing New York, starring Step-
penwolf's Gary Sinise and John 
Matkovich and directed by Sinise 
(see The Cresset, September, 1982.) 
In March of this year, Matkovich 
returned to New York playing Biff 
to Dustin Hoffman's Willy in Death 
of a Salesman (see The Cresset, April , 
1984), where he was acclaimed as a 
new star. On the afternoon follow-
ing Salesman 's Broadway premiere, 
Malkovich was examining the stage 
of the Circle Repertory Theatre in 
Sheridan Square where he was to 
begin directing a revival of Step-
penwolf's production of Balm in 
Gilead by Lanford Wilson (see The 
Cresset, October, 1981). 
The Steppenwolf productions 
were not the only ones looking back 
over their shoulders at us from the 
John Steven Paul teaches in the Speech 
and Drama Department at Valparaiso 
University and covers the world of 
Theatre for The Cresset. 
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theatre pages of the New York Times 
this summer. The two most prom-
inent non-musical productions cur-
rently on Broadway were born last 
spring at the Goodman Theatre. 
Begun at the Goodman Studio, the 
production of David Rabe's Hurty-
burly was an extraordinary enter-
prise which combined the talents of 
director Mike Nichols and several 
important younger actors including 
Christopher Walken, William Hurt, 
Harvey Keitel , and Sigourney 
Weaver. 
The other Goodman product won 
the Pulitzer Prize for drama in 1984. 
This is David Mamet's Glengarry 
Glen Ross, which is playing at the 
John Golden Theatre. While Hurty-
burly borrowed the Goodman Thea-
tre for a tryout, Glengarry Glen Ross 
was a true resident theatre produc-
tion : Goodman artiStic director 
Gregory Mosher directed, Chicago 
designers did the sets and costumes, 
and a superior group of Chicago-
based actors comprised the cast. 
David Mamet is among the two or 
three most important playwrights 
working in the American theatre 
and a major work might be expected 
to go to New York, but he is also a 
resident playwright with a clear 
sense of his relationship to a com-
munity. (Although Mamet now lives 
in Vermont, he is Associate Artistic 
Director of the Goodman.) In fact , 
Glengarry Glen Ross grew from 
Mamet's own experience as an un-
employed actor working in a real 
estate office in Chicago. 
In his latest play, Mamet returns 
to the world of his earlier Amen·can 
Buffalo: petty American capitalism. 
Buffalo is about three small-time 
burglars and hustlers and the resale 
store that they use to front their ille-
gitimate activities. Glengarry Glen 
Ross is about a different kind of 
hustler, the real estate salesman sell-
ing land in Florida, dubbed the 
"Glengarry Highlands" and "Glen 
Ross farms ." The language, the 
ethics, and even the personalities in 
the two plays are similar. And Mam-
et has proven that he is a master at 
cultivating a rich and complex 
world, albeit an inhospitable one, 
from a fertile subject. Though it is 
not a world we care to inhabit once 
we are inside, the completeness and 
the density of Mamet's milieu dead-
en our awareness of any reality 
other than the one in which he sur-
rounds us. With no opportunity for 
peering outside it, we are left to 
make of this world what we can. 
Mamet's real estate business is a 
man's world. And Glengarry Glen 
Ross is a man's play, about men's 
pain, men's needs, men's codes, and 
men's talk. It is appropriate that the 
City of the Big Shoulders should 
export a men's play to New York, 
though these men don't work in the 
steel mills and the stockyards of 
Carl Sandburg's vision. They are 
laborers in the service industry, 
where America is still a world leader. 
Just below the wafer-thin veneer 
of the civility, cordiality, and refine-
ment required in modern social 
transactions, Mamet sees a primi-
tive, pre-modern world. In this 
world men go bravely out to hunt 
and bring the kill back to camp. 
Some of the men are fitter for the 
task than others; the strong thrive, 
the weak fail. Glengarry Glen Ross is 
a drama of the struggle for survival. 
Mamet's dramatic language is 
sufficiently big-shouldered to em-
body this drama of men in mortal 
conflict. Their talk reflects a large 
catalog of male motives. It consists 
of attacks, defenses , poses, viola-
tions , cries , and consolations. These 
men philosophize, posture, dissem-
ble, teach, brag, and support. Si-
multaneously, they use the language 
of the conqueror, the king, and the 
rapist. It's all talk, but it's not cheap. 
Talk is the civilian's way of waging 
life's wars. 
The language operates on the pre-
linguistic level of vocal utterance, 
measured in terms of volume, in-
flection, rate, and rhythm. The 
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playwright is very much aware of 
the pulse of a line. His printed text, 
carefully marked with italics to 
emphasize the accented syllabl es, 
reads like a boxing match. His char-
acters sound like animals in the 
struggle for survival, often crow-
ing, and whimpering, and snarling. 
If the language is deliberately poor 
in image and metaphor, it is rhyth-
mically vita l and gesturally rich. It 
is written for the muscles , not for 
the mind. 
Act I is a series of three linguistic 
confrontations which takes place in a 
secluded booth of a neighborhood 
Chinese restaurant. The first pair 
of combatants is made up of Shelly 
Levene, a fiftyish , grizzled hunter 
of long experience, and the real es-
tate office executive, John William-
son , a man in his early forties. The 
latter's language is softer, quieter, 
and refined. He has never been out 
"on the street." Levene has not won 
a battle lately. He's desperate ; he 
needs money; he's afraid of being 
fired ; hi manhood is being chal-
lenged; he hurts. Worse, only the 
sa lesmen who have successfully 
closed deals receive the leads on 
potential customers most likely to 
purchase: catch 22. Levene reminds 
the younger Williamson of past ser-
vice to the company and his success-
ful sales record of yesteryear. The 
older man protests, pleads, and 
whimpers. The younger man is mer-
ci less and implacable. In a final act 
of prostration, Levene bribes Wil-
liamson. Williamson cooly refuses 
to respond until he sees the color of 
Levene's money. The shaming is 
complete. 
A new pair of conversants replaces 
the first in the cherry-red-vinyl 
booth. Moss and Aaronow, two sa les-
men in their fifties, commiserate 
about their losing streaks. Moss, 
mouthy, florid , and angry, and 
Aaronow, mousy, grey, and fright-
ened, lay their problems at William-
son's feet. He has given them dead-
beat leads: "Polacks and Indians," 
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people who keep their money in a 
sock, who'd never make an "invest-
ment." And now another indignity: 
a sales contest where salesmen who 
close deals move up toward the top 
of a contest board . (The winners 
receive luxury cars.) 
Moss and Aaronow speak the lan-
guage of position: salesmen who 
don't close deals are down, but good 
salesmen come back from losing 
streaks; winners get up on the board ; 
losers get bumped offthe board. No 
sales no board; no board no leads; 
no leads no sales. It hurts , says Moss. 
Aaronow's pain shows in the lines 
of his haggard face . Somebody 
should hurt them back, says Moss. 
Leads on potentia l buyers are the 
currency of this realm. Leads mean 
a chance not only to survive but to 
succeed. People would do almost 
anything to get the leads; other peo-
ple would pay to have those leads. 
Somebody, Moss says, ought to bur-
glarize the office. 
Recently, David Mamet 
has said that "the older 
I get, the more in love 
I get with the traditional 
aspects of dramaturgy." 
In the third scene of the first act a 
pair of younger men sit at the tables. 
One of them is Richard Roma, cur-
rently the most successful salesman 
at the office. In this scene he is the 
somewhat smug venditor cogitatio, 
reflecting on himself and his posi-
tion vis-a-vis the universe. In his own 
natural brand of existentialist dis-
course-studded with earthy refer-
ences to sex, food , defecation, and 
shelter-Roma laments the separa-
tion of modern man from any over-
arching universe of meaning, re-
marks on the apparent randomness 
of experience and the prevalence of 
chance, and affirms the validity of 
freely chosen action. His holding 
forth is not entirely reflexive. He 
addresses himself to the man sitting 
next to him, James Lingk. Though 
he doesn't know him, Roma reaches 
out to the sad little man, who sits 
non-plussed and captivated, as if at 
the feet of a brilliant academician . 
When he senses that he has immo-
bilized his prey with his rhetorical 
arrows, Roma springs on him , 
brandishing a brochure on the Glen-
garry Highlands, Florida. Lingk 
succumbs. 
Recently, David Mamet has said 
that "the older I get, the more in 
love I get with the traditional as-
pects of dramaturgy." In many ways 
Glengarry Glen Ross is a traditionally 
structured work. In Act I, Mamet 
establishes the conflicts: the sales-
men versus their own business, 
which by its very nature oppresses 
them. He goes on to develop the 
possible action that the salesmen 
might take against that business. 
Perhaps more importantly, in his 
expositional act, the playwright 
establishes the context in which 
such action could take place. The 
social context is marked by cutthroat 
competition and malign indiffer-
ence to the fate of one's fellows. 
There is also the linguistic context, 
the universe of language which rep-
resents action . Mamet's characters 
are what they say they are and do 
what they say they do. For Mamet, 
language, to quote Kenneth Burke, 
is truly symbolic action. The climac-
tic scene in Act II will mark the high 
point of the conflict and also the 
most incisive linguistic exchange. 
In the beginning of Act II, Shelly 
Levene struts in with a contract in 
his maw. He has brought it back 
from a battle with two deadbeats -
prospects to whom no one has pre-
viously been able to sell property . 
His reward is the privilege of telling 
the office about it. Suddenly he 
looks around and starts at the con-
dition of the real estate office, which 
has been trashed by burglars. Among 
other things, the leads have been 
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stolen, a theft of such seriousness 
that it is tantamount to a capital 
crime. A Chicago police detective is 
"interviewing" the salesmen one by 
one as they arrive at the office. Be-
cause they all so desperately want 
and need the prime leads, they are 
all suspects and they are all victims. 
But Levene demands his victory 
festival. Bardlike he narrates the 
details of his dealing: the circling, 
the feinting, the attack, the retreat, 
and finally the close. Shelly "the 
Machine" Levene is back and he can 
taste each word of the story. Moss 
storms out of the police interview 
cursing his treatment. Levene goes 
on with his story. Aaronow staggers 
out of the interview complaining of 
gestapo tactics. Levene continues, 
having now won the attention of the 
young hot shot Roma. The younger 
man, though he has problems of his 
own, understands his role in this 
victory ritual. 
It takes a major threat to jar the 
salesman out of his hero's discourse. 
Roma spies just such a threat walk-
ing up the street in the person of 
James Lingk. Through the building 
wall Roma can sense that Lingk has 
changed his mind about the Glen-
garry Highlands deal. With barely 
a prompt from Roma, Levene as-
sumes an appointed role in the 
younger salesman's impromptu 
drama designed to deflect the wav-
ering customer from his intention 
to cancel the deal. Levene plays 
"Morton, the senior vice-president 
of American Express," who has 
bought a great deal of property 
from Roma's firm. Roma is a "friend 
of the family" who must hurry Mr. 
Morton to the airport before attend-
ing his wife's birthday party on the 
north shore. Though the outer office 
looks like the inside of a food pro-
cessor and there's an interrogation 
going on in the inner office, Roma 
and Levene are able to play their 
scene with a cool virtuosity that 
deters Lingk from his mission. When 
he can get a word in, the man begs 
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Roma to understand that it is Mrs. 
Lingk who has insisted that the deal 
be cancelled. 
Mrs. Lingk (who does not appear) 
evidently understands something 
about men and business. For she 
has further instructed her husband 
that he not talk to the salesman. Sim-
ply cancel the deal; no negotiations. 
Should Roma not cooperate, Mrs. 
Lingk will call the state's attorney. 
Roma's objective is precisely that 
which Mrs. Lingk has feared. The 
salesman wants to get the customer 
out of the office and to the Chinese 
restaurant, the talking arena. But 
Lingk has been programmed by his 
wife to repeat: "cancel the deal." In 
an attempt to break the man free of 
his wife's dictates, Roma assures 
Lingk that no action has been taken 
on the deal, that the contract is still 
in the office, and that their relation-
ship has nothing to do with any deal : 
Forget the deal. Jimmy. (Pause.) Forget 
the deal ... you know me. The deal's dead. 
Am I talking about the deal? That's over. 
Please. Let 's talk about you. Come on . 
(Pause. Roma rises and starts walking to· 
ward the front door.) Come on. (Pause.) 
Come on. Jim. (Pause.) I want to tell you 
something. Your life is your own . You have 
a contract with your wife. You have cer-
tain things you do jointly , you have a bond 
there ... and there are other things. Those 
things are yours. You needn't feel ashamed, 
Lizards in Love 
A lusty lizard curls round 
a mottled lizardess He 
green - his carmine disc 
brazen as a clay pigeon -
awaits the shot 
pale unicornt> 
\fill never fire at green-
ing lovers careening 
dangerously. 
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you needn't feel that you're being untrue. 
or that she would abandon you if she knew. 
This is your life. (Pause.) Yes. Now I want 
to talk to you because you're obviously up-
set and that concerns me. Now let's go. 
Right now. (Lingk gets up and they start 
for the door.) 
Roma is a master manipulator. If 
he is absolutely cynical, then his 
rhetorical skill is even more remark-
able. He appeals to Lingk, not as a 
customer, but as a human being, as 
an individual, a free agent, a man. 
This is how men talk to men. Roma 
reminds him that he is free to make 
contracts, to act joint! y, and to honor 
commitments. He is also, however, 
free to act independently; in fact, 
Roma implies, the world expects 
that a man will act independently, 
at least on occasion. Lingk's ob~ious 
discomfort-he is unable to choke 
out more than a three-word phrase-
indicates that he knows and feels 
that expectation , but is unable to 
fulfill it. The man is no longer in 
need of a professional real estate 
salesman, but of a professional coun-
selor, someone who understands 
men's problems. Roma offers his 
services. There will be time enough, 
he thinks, to revitalize the deal. 
As the men are about to leave the 
office and Roma and Levene see 
their cooperation about to be suc-
cessful, Williamson enters the room. 
He sees that Lingk is upset and 
cheerily assures him that he needn't 
worry about the office burglary. His 
contract has been sent to the bank 
and is well on the way to being final-
ized. Lingk's face falls. He turns to 
Roma for a confirmation or denial 
and reads it in the salesman's angry 
countenance. In spite of the fact that 
it is Lingk who has been wronged, 
the prospect of ending his relation-
ship with Roma is loathsome to him. 
Sensing that his wife has under-
mined manliness, he apologizes pro-
fusely to Roma for disappointing 
him and rushes from the office. With 
him goes Roma's last chance for the 
deal. 
Williamson has committed an 
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unpardonable sin; he has fouled a 
deal when it was at a critical junc-
ture. Roma's anger would seem to 
be leading toward a physical assault, 
but instead he powers his language 
with debilitating insults . As James 
Lingk slams the office door behind 
him , Roma berates Williamson with 
a viciousness that surpasses anything 
spoken in the play . In addition to 
hurling at him nearly every ob-
scenity imaginable, Roma makes a 
particular point of naming him a 
"child ," whose lack of experience is 
inhibiting men who are trying to 
earn a living. 
Perhaps twenty per cent 
of all the words in the 
play are derivations of 
that most famous of all 
A nglo-Saxon obscenities. 
Mamet' s characters use it 
in every part of speech. 
At the point of Roma's verbal 
assault on Williamson, Mamet's lan-
guage is unprintable in a family 
magazine such as The Cresset. Indeed, 
the crudity of the play's language 
provoked considerable comment in 
the press and considerable uncom-
fortable giggling from the matinee 
audiences. In kind, the language 
isn 't much different than that de-
leted from the White House Tran-
scripts when they were published in 
1974. But the quantity and the prev-
alence of this obscene language is 
notable in a stage play, though it 
probably wouldn't be so notable in 
an actual business office or in an 
out of the way booth in an actual 
Chinese restaurant. Perhaps twenty 
per cent of all the words in the play 
are derivations of that most famous 
of all Anglo-Saxon obscenities. 
Mamet's characters use the word in 
nearly every part of speech: verb, 
noun, adjective, adverb, gerund, etc. 
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One might observe that the ex-
tensive use of such language reveals 
the characters' limited vocabulary. 
Or, that in men-only business situa-
tions , it is natural for men to derive 
their lingua franca from the locker 
room and the dormitory: boys will 
be boys. But it seems to me that 
Mamet has chosen his language 
quite carefully as a way of delineat-
ing his world. The characters of 
Glengarry Glen Ross habitually em-
ploy the language of rape. Their 
obscenities are drained of their 
power as expletives, but they serve 
as painful evidence of the frequency 
with which human beings are vio-
lated in this world. That rape lan-
guage should permeate this men's 
play so thoroughly testifies to the 
fact that, in American society, the 
issue of rape transcends the gender 
gap. 
It is Levene, by the way, who has 
burglarized the office and stolen the 
leads. He has sold them to a com-
petitor in the real estate business 
for five thousand dollars. He be-
comes so exuberant in verbal at-
tacks on Williamson that he slips up 
and gives himself away. Levene lives 
by the word and dies by the word. 
Williamson, the sharper of the two, 
catches the inadvertent admission 
of guilt immediately. After giving 
Levene an opportunity to debase 
himself by begging for mercy, he 
sneers and goes into the police de-
tective to disclose his evidence. 
First, he takes a moment to inform 
Levene that the buyers on his last 
deal are certifiably insane and in-
solvent. 
The denouement is brief. The 
problem of being a man is that when 
you'Fe really down there is no one 
to talk to. Big shoulders are meant 
only to bt:: cried on. Levene silently 
contemplates his gloomy future. 
Roma announces that he'll be at the 
restaurant. Aaronow, in a voice all 
weltschmerz, pronounces the final 
word on this world. "0 God, I hate 
this job." •• •• 
Christianity and 
Politics 
Gail McGrew Eifrig 
Long ago, in the presidential cam-
paign of 1960, a good deal was said 
about religion in the public realm. 
As I remember it, some people were 
exercised over the possibility of a 
Roman Catholic occupying the 
White House, and the airwaves and 
newspapers were agitatedly filled 
with speculation on the subject. I 
had not seen, or perhaps more ac-
curately, had not noticed much po-
litical action at that time, and so the 
rumors and speculations took on a 
somewhat larger importance than 
they deserved. 
I assumed that what many writers 
wrote about during the campaign 
would actually turn out to be of con-
sequence in the course of the next 
four years' presidency. Would the 
Pope require John Kennedy to do 
something that the nation's interest 
should forbid? Could Kennedy be 
loyal to his oath of office when he 
had an allegiance to a foreign power? 
Events proved the fearmongers to 
be naively inaccurate; as Americans 
we were to experience assassinations 
and Vietnam, but not a takeover of 
the White House by the Vatican. 
This campaign has seen another 
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resurgence of interest in the relative 
places of religion and politics in 
public life. We have heard one can-
didate accuse the President of being 
unchristian because of his policies 
on federal welfare. The governor of 
New York has been accused by his 
bishop of not being a true church-
man because of a public position on 
abortion. A leader on what has been 
called "the religious right" has in-
sisted that a Supreme Court justice 
should, before taking the oath of 
office, swear to uphold a particular 
moral position. 
These charges and countercharges 
may well subside after the election, 
but their foundations are revelatory 
about the nature of religion in 
America. During my lifetime, the 
phrase "under God" was inserted 
into the Pledge of Allegiance, and 
school prayer was deleted from the 
school day, so that in my own history 
the ambivalence and uncertainty 
about public religion has been pretty 
neatly demonstrated. What appears 
striking about these instances, and 
others like them, is that they have a 
place so near the center of American 
political thinking, rather than on 
the fringes. 
An oration like Jesse Jackson's at 
the Democratic National Conven-
tion would be nearly unthinkable 
in other political cultures, with the 
exception of the Middle Eastern 
countries now struggling with the 
revitalization of a super-militant 
Islam, or the bitter jeremiads of 
Northern Ireland. That a large 
group of mainstream Americans, all 
of whom can be called members of 
one of the two largest political par-
ties anywhere, listen to a long ser-
mon with enthusiasm is a remark-
able phenomenon. It would seem 
more likely in nineteenth-century 
revival history, but in twentieth-
century San Francisco? The assump-
tion of a religious stance has taken 
on great importance in the American 
political scene. 
Surely this is demonstrated by the 
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way in which the two major parties 
have both "recovered" a religious 
outlook. In the last election, the 
Democrats appeared to be a motley 
group of weirdos and oddballs, free 
of hang-ups, turned on, tuned in to 
every cause, however strange. How 
did their candidate get to be Jimmy 
Carter? The Republicans, ever 
shrewd, co-opted religion for their 
side like a piece of copyrighted 
campaign literature. All the people 
who cared about apple pie, mother-
hood, the flag, and school prayer 
were voting on the Republican side. 
Before this present campaign, 
however, the Democrats decided 
that they should have God on their 
side too, and they made sure that 
everybody knew that Democrats had 
as much religion as Republicans. 
Ferraro's good Catholic girlhood 
became prominent before she ac-
cused Reagan of not being a Chris-
tian, and Jackson's rhetoric nailed 
down what was already in place be-
fore the convention. You didn't, it 
turned out, have to be a Republican 
to pray or to call on the name of the 
Lord at a public meeting. 
The odd thing about all this cen-
Making Metaphors 
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ters, as so many things do, on defini-
tions. In the accusations and coun-
ter-accusations, religion is usually 
made synonymous with Christianity. 
But what definition of Christianity 
is being used when Ferraro says Rea-
gan is not a Christian? She implied 
that a Christian is a person whose 
efforts go to make sure that the poor 
are fed, that the sick are cared for, 
that the helpless receive help. And 
there is the best scriptural precedent 
for such a definition. "By their fruits 
ye shall know them," Jesus replied 
when he was asked how to recognize 
his followers. 
Using the criterion above, though, 
is tricky. Is Reagan a Christian Pres-
ident when he personally seeks to 
relieve the suffering of the poor? Or 
when his official policies attempt to 
redress the inevitable suffering that 
other official policies almost in-
evitably produce? Can government 
be Christian, or can only governors 
be Christian, if to be Christian 
means to care for the helpless? 
And who are the helpless? Fer-
raro is caught having to say that her 
Christian concern for those in need 
focuses on women who don't want to 
bear a particular child, and not on 
the child whose mother does not 
want to bear it. She may have a dif-
ferent preference as a private Chris-
tian, but as a public Christian, which 
is what she wants Reagan to be, her 
preference is for one group rather 
than the other, and there is not 
widespread agreement on which of 
those two groups is more in need. 
If the definition of a Christian is 
that person whose primary concern 
is the well-being of others, then that 
definition is of little help in clarify-
ing the position a Christian ought 
to take on a public issue. In fact, 
there seems little about the defini-
tion which is specifically Christian 
at all, since it looks like an ethical 
or moral imperative to which almost 
any religiously sympathetic person, 
or any humanist for that matter, 
would claim adherence. 
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Why is it Christian to want (or not 
want) the MX missile? One would 
think that is the kind of prudential 
issue on which reasonable people 
could disagree without tying the 
matter to the quality of one's Chris-
tianity. Is opposition to the death pen-
alty a Christian position? The Cath-
olic bishops have come very close to 
saying so. But is it true that rever-
ence for life is the keystone of Chris-
tian faith? If so, my Buddhist neigh-
bor can be my Christian brother. 
It appears that this campaign 
should have taught us, if we had 
not learned it before, that Christian-
ity cannot be co-opted for one politi-
cal position or another. One of the 
new things we might have learned 
is that no institution, not even the 
church itself, can define our public 
duty by means of a definition of the 
faith. This lesson, which Protestants 
have been struggling to live with for 
centuries, is being learned by our 
Roman brethren, as Mario Cuomo's 
wrestling with his bishop demon-
strates. If it were so easy to deter-
mine how the good Christian should 
vote, it would indeed be easy to tell 
the sheep from the goats, easy to 
decide which party to support, easy 
to know which protest to join, which 
crusade to invest in. 
This campaign should 
have taught us, if we 
had not learned it before, 
that Christianity cannot 
be co-opted politically. 
But even that kind of ease is de-
nied to us Christians. "Follow me," 
has hundreds of paths, each of them 
different. Crucial in the definition 
of the Christian is the admonition 
to bear the cross, and that is an ad-
monition which strikes no respon-
sive chord in mainstream American 
political life, however fervently it 




Comparisons between the arts of 
northern and southern Europe are 
an inevitable part of any humanities 
education. While the South pro-
duced an endless elegance and al-
most superficial simplicity, artists 
in the North struggled with more 
severe structural and philosophical 
dilemmas; while Corelli and Vivaldi 
were aligning sequences and repeti-
tions which glide effortlessly 
through time, in the formal com-
plexity and contrapuntal detail of 
the northern masters we find monu-
ments of temporal manipulation. 
Given the rampant eclecticism of 
modern art, it may be inappropriate, 
particularly in the United States 
where regions are not so strongly 
delineated by ethnicity or language, 
to attempt a geographic demarcation 
of style. Nonetheless, instructive 
comparisons can be made between 
northern and southern attitudes to-
ward the arts in general. The intense 
growth of artistic institutions in the 
North during the first half of this 
century was closely linked to indus-
trial prosperity and extensive dis-
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posable income. The post-World 
War II transformation of the agrar-
ian South into a modern industrial 
complex with ever rising population 
and diversified economic growth 
might well allow us to expect a sim-
ilar burgeoning of the arts here. The 
Cinderella-like transformation of 
the South, however, is far from in-
vulnerable, as we witness in the dif-
ficulties plaguing the 1984 New 
Orleans World Exposition. 
An integral part of the new South, 
Louisiana has become less like a 
foreign country for outsiders than 
it was in the past, but one is still 
easily impressed by the state 's 
uniqueness. Visually Louisiana is 
seductive at any time of year. Cy-
press and Live Oak trees, festooned 
with Spanish moss, stand in exotic 
array along the bayous and swamps 
hosting the phenomenal assortment 
of wildlife which has justified the 
state's reputation as a sportsman's 
paradise. The pace of life here is 
very slow; time seems to be a plenti-
ful commodity. 
The most striking transformations 
in this semi-tropical paradise have 
occured in the area known as the 
"Cajun triangle," an area extending 
along the Gulf of Mexico from be-
low New Orleans to Lake Charles 
in the West and to Alexandria and 
the Red River in the north. The 
Hollywood stereotype of Cajuns as 
barefoot swamprats who sleep on 
moss-stuffed mattresses belies a com-
plex culture which is attempting to 
balance new-found prosperity and 
an insurgence of external influences 
with the difficult task of preserving 
a cultural identity. 
The Acadians ("Cajun" is a deriv-
ative) settled in Louisiana during 
the eighteenth century following 
their expulsion by the British from 
Nova Scotia (originally called Aca-
dia) for refusing to renounce Roman 
Catholicism and swear allegiance 
to the British crown. Expecting a 
sympathetic welcome from fellow 
Frenchmen in New Orleans, the 
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Cajuns were afforded a less than 
hospitable reception by the class-
conscious Creoles and were obliged 
to settle across the vast Atchafalaya 
swamp on the fertile coastal plains. 
The Cajuns developed a close-knit 
social fabric and devised ingenious 
solutions to problems of food and 
housing in the unpredictable Louis-
iana climate. 
When oil was discovered in Louis-
iana in the twentieth century, social 
and political structures had to adapt. 
In the city of Lafayette, known as the 
"hub city" of the Cajuns, the impact 
of oil dollars is everywhere in evi-
dence. This once sleepy college 
town has recently boasted one of 
the highest concentrations of mil-
lionaires, fastest growth rates, and 
lowest unemployment rates in the 
country. Shopping centers and res-
taurants have proliferated as oil and 
office complexes spread through 
the city. 
One would expect this dramatic 
increase in disposable income to 
trickle down to the arts. If we first 
compare the economic boom here 
with conditions in the North earlier 
in the century, however, we discover 
some glaring differences, differ-
ences which do not bode well for the 
rapid growth of the arts. The nou-
veau riche of the Gulf Coast general-
ly became wealthy overnight as a re-
sult of the highly volatile petro-
chemical industry , whereas the 
wealth of the northern industrial-
ists was achieved through patience, 
dedication, and ingenuity, a view 
as much inclined toward the future 
as toward the immediate return. 
Whereas new wealth in the North 
still tends to imitate older wealth in 
order to acquire social respectabil-
ity, the new wealth of the South is 
arrogant, proud to be "just plain 
folks," to have amassed a fortune 
without having amassed education 
or refinement. 
There is , as a result, less social 
incentive to patronize the arts here 
than in the North. Arts patronage 
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by the old plantation aristocracy is 
somehow viewed as one of the frail-
ties of the old South. Without the 
lure of tax benefits, private and cor-
porate support of the arts in Louis-
iana would be slight. Unbridled 
prosperity historically inculcates an 
insulation of the upper classes 
against the needs of the world at 
large and against that natural curi-
osity which might stimulate cul-
turally significant growth in the 
arts. However, the recent oil glut 
has tempered economic prosperity 
and facilitated a period of reassess-
ment. 
The friction that has existed be-
tween the fragile veneer of formality 
and politeness which recall the Vic-
torian leisure of the plantation cul-
ture and the raw energy of the high-
tech industrialism which is sup-
planting it seems to be wearing 
down. Peaceful coexistence is in the 
best interests of both, for both are 
veneers which have worn precar-
iously thin themselves, the first hav-
ing outlived its utility as a social 
adhesive and the latter being built 
on an ecological foundation which 
could disappear as quickly as it 
sprang into existence. The arts pro-
vide a logical meeting ground be-
tween the two, a civilizing influence 
which welcomes prosperity but 
seeks to imbue the resulting society 
with an inner strength of character 
and sensitivity. 
The Cajuns are well aware that 
prosperity has come largely because 
of the influx of outside influences, 
yet this same influx has created a 
resurgence of interest in what it 
means to be "cajun." For more than 
a century, the French underpinnings 
of Louisiana were pervasive enough 
to absorb waves of German, Irish, 
Spanish, and Italian immigrants, to 
assimilate each of these without sac-
rificing its own integrity. Following 
World War II, however, the primary 
goal here, as in most of the country, 
was to dissolve into the American 
melting pot, to quell the peculiar-
1t1es which make Cajuns unique. 
In the last decade, all that is Cajun 
has once again become very chic. 
This is particularly evident in the 
renewed interest in preserving the 
Cajun language. Twenty years ago 
children were discouraged from 
speaking Cajun French in public 
and were often punished for speak-
ing it in school. Now the language is 
again part of the curriculum in even 
the younger grades, and local radio 
and television broadcasts include 
substantial amounts of French pro-
gramming. Sadly, these efforts may 
be too little too late, for decreasing 
numbers of Cajuns, and these main-
ly the elderly and illiterate, continue 
to speak the unique Cajun patois. 
If the language is having difficulty 
surviving the onslaught of modern-
ization, Cajun music is enjoying an 
unprecedented success. The tradi-
tional Cajun approach to life is 
summed up best in the ubiquitous 
expression "laissez les bons temps 
roulez!" A carnival atmosphere 
reigns here not only during the 
week-long Mardi Gras festivities, 
during which virtually the entire 
community comes to a halt, but also 
during the months of festivals which 
follow. Each community honors its 
local flavor with a festival. The fes-
tival may be held in honor of alli-
gators, crawfish, frogs, shrimp, rice, 
sugar cane, boudin sausage, or a 
host of other distinctly Cajun favor-
ites. The festivals attract people 
from across the nation and consist 
largely of craft shows, mass con-
sumption of the world-renowned 
local cuisines, and uninhibited danc-
ing and merrymaking. It is hard to 
imagine any event which could lay 
claim to being authentically Cajun 
which would not incorporate music 
and dancing. 
There may be Cajuns who resent 
the intrusion of ethnologists from 
across the country beating paths to 
Louisiana to collect and catalogue 
local musics and folklore, but few 
are averse to the resulting boom in 
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the local entertainment industry. 
Lately, Cajun performers have been 
honored with many major awards, 
including several Grammies. Cajun 
music falls into numerous stylistic 
categories, including several hy-
brids (such as "zydeco") which have 
incorporated elements of more pop-
ular rock styles, but most of these 
share the same basic timbres: accor-
dions, guitars, and fiddles. The mu-
sic often incorporates microtonal in-
flections to a degree which most 
audiences would not tolerate in art 
musics, and a perpetual rhythmic 
drive with frequent misplaced met-
ric units. The harmony is extremely 
limited, moving lazily between as 
few as three or four chords in a sin-
gle work. This music may have de-
veloped in comparative isolation, 
but it shares more than a cursory 
similarity to Appalachian and 
Canadian folk musics. 
The renaissance of Cajun aware-
ness has afforded an almost excessive 
amount of attention to local folk 
music. For the outsider and the na-
tive alike, Cajun music may repre-
sent the soul of Cajun identity, but 
for those of us who are involved with 
concert music, it is simply another 
contender for a limited supply of 
time and dollars . As the novelty be-
gins to wane for the renaissance 
movement , the pendulum may 
swing more favorably toward art 
music. There are signs that this is 
already beginning to occur. 
Artistic trends in Louisiana have 
favored the preservation of the past 
as a buffer against the new. What is 
peculiar in all of this ethnic preser-
vation, however, is that some very 
significant aspects of Louisiana's 
past are usually overlooked. St. 
Martinville, the quiet little town on 
the banks of Bayou Teche that 
forms the backdrop for the final 
scene of Longfellow's Evangeline, is 
today a typical Cajun town. Not so 
in the eighteenth century, when St. 
Martinville was home to scores of 
wealthy French aristocrats fleeing 
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the revolution and scores of wealthy 
Caribbean planters fleeing slave 
rebellions. For decades remnants of 
continental culture were carefully 
cultivated in "le Petit Paris." The 
ancient building on Main street 
which now houses the Bienvenue 
Brothers Clothiers was once the 
"French opera house," host to many 
performers brought from their 
engagements at New Orleans' opera 
house. It is doubtful that any real 
productions of any scope could have 
been offered in such a small build-
ing, but this was a significant effort 
to build artistic institutions in Louis-
iana along European lines. Follow-
ing the Civil War these institutions 
disappeared, mainly for economic 
reasons. Seldom viewed as an essen-
tial part of the local heritage, they 
are generally ignored today by all 
but a handful. 
The renaissance of Cajun 
awareness has afforded 
an almost excessive 
amount of attention 
to local folk music. 
For decades those who would 
build artistic institutions in Acadi-
ana have worked in isolation and 
frustration. The oil boom has 
brought not only the necessary cash 
flow but also an accompanying col-
lection of new talent and ideas. The 
struggling few have multiplied in 
numbers and now constitute a base 
of energy and interest from which 
permanent artistic institutions will 
arise. 
One important gauge of this is 
the development of semi-profession-
al symphony orchestras. The Baton 
Rouge Symphony, which has strug-
gled for years to attain a level of fair 
compensation and a diversified sea-
son, has recently reinforced the core 
of the orchestra by hiring first one 
and then a second full-time string 
quartet. Most of the personnel for 
these ensembles was drawn, pre-
dictably, from the graduating ranks 
of the Louisiana State University 
School of Music. Like graduates at 
most regional colleges, these young 
musicians are aware of the difficul-
ties which may be anticipated in 
building a solid experience port-
folio, and they welcome the sym-
phony's new program. 
The benefits are not just limited 
to the orchestra and the university, 
for the city and region as a whole 
have also benefitted. These string 
players perform at local schools to 
build audiences for the future and 
also present concerts of chamber 
music. In addition, they perform 
with the Vermilion Chamber Or-
chestra, a splinter group of the Baton 
Rouge Symphony, which has pre-
sented concerts in Lafayette during 
the past two seasons. Even northern 
cities of moderate size have rarely 
attempted such innovative mea-
sures; they were unprecedented 
throughout the South until our 
time. Even the city of Lake Charles, 
which has long felt like the poor 
step-child of the Louisiana boom, 
has been able to start a semi-pro-
fessional orchestra in the last few 
years, and Lafayette has formed a 
blue-ribbon panel of prominent citi-
zens to oversee its new orchestra 
which is scheduled to debut this 
month. 
All of this growth, like so much in 
the South, has its paradox, for we 
are reminded that the state's only 
ranking professional orchestra is 
annually on the brink of financial 
collapse. The directors in New Or-
leans have grasped at straws in plac-
ing Philippe Entremont on the 
podium. His sparkling career as a 
pianist gave no hint that he might 
be a competent music director. His 
subsequent work has done little to 
change that impression, but Entre-
mont at least can offer name recog-
nition and, even more important in 
Louisiana, a French name at that. 
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The recent expansion of artistic 
activity is seen here in programming 
of all types. In Lafayette, the Fine 
Arts Foundation, headed by an 
energetic young Englishman who 
has parlayed a miniscule budget 
ten years ago into a sizable series of 
chamber, solo, orchestral, and dance 
concerts, has presented such major 
talents as the American Ballet Thea-
tre, the Prague Symphony, Pinchas 
Zuckermann, and Mikhail Barysh-
nikov. Lafayette's Community Con-
certs and the University of South-
western Louisiana also sponsor ma-
jor performance series to provide 
cultural opportunities which are 
exemplary for a city of 100,000. 
In spite of this, audiences for 
everything except ballet remain 
small and the process of educating 
the public is very slow. The Acadi-
ana Arts Council, an umbrella or-
ganization which coordinates arts 
efforts in the region, sponsors num-
erous programs which send profes-
sional artists into the schools to ex-
plain and demonstrate their work. 
Because music and the arts are still 
viewed as frills and there are few 
curricula which incorporate long-
range arts instruction, we cannot 
expect such token programs to make 
a major impact. At present, public 
school music in Acadiana, where it 
exists at all, is limited to choirs and 
marching bands. Even concert band 
programs receive limited attention 
due to the demands made on stu-
dents by the marching organizations, 
which remain active not only 
throughout football season, but also 
during the Mardi Gras celebrations. 
Music is treated as a practical com-
modity, not as an art, and it is nigh 
impossible to instill a respect for 
musical art in this context or to ex-
pand a student's horizons to a point 
where he might be curious to expe-
rience other musical delights. 
On the peripheries, the influx of 
young talent has enlivened activity 
in new and early musics in Louis-
iana. New Orleans recently hosted a 
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sizable early music festival in con-
junction with the World Exposition 
and the accompanying Sun King 
Exhibition being held at the Cabildo 
on Jackson Square. Some of the top 
soloists and ensembles in the coun-
try participated. Smaller university-
based ensembles are attempting to 
lure audiences in smaller cities to 
this neglected repertoire. 
If we are witnessing a 
musical reawakening in 
Louisiana's secular arts 
institutions, the same is 
more difficult to see in 
the realm of church music. 
As with efforts in early music, 
composers and new music enthu-
siasts are beginning to realize the 
importance of joint efforts in rea-
lizing their goals. Louisiana State 
University has sponsored a new 
music festival each spring for many 
years. L.S.U. has steadily built the 
festival into a major event, but has 
not actively encouraged participa-
tion from universities outside of 
Baton Rouge. Because of extensive 
turnover in music faculties through-
out Louisiana in the last few years, 
there are now enough musicians 
who are not limited by the past 
politics of the state educational sys-
tem that we may expect increasing 
cooperation. 
Last March a consortium of uni-
versity faculties formed the Central 
Gulf Theory Society to provide a 
forum for new ideas and researches 
in music theory. Similar societies 
have operated in other parts of the 
country for many years. The in-
augural meeting of the CGTS at-
tracted theorists and composers 
from four states and focused on a 
wide variety of historical and prac-
tical topics . Most important for the 
participants was the opportunity to 
meet with other artists who share 
common aims and problems and to 
discuss solutions. A resounding suc-
cess, the meetings will become an-
nual events. 
If local performing organizations 
have made little effort to incorpor-
ate contemporary music into their 
repertoires, it has been because of 
inadequate lobbying efforts on the 
part of composers. This, too, is show-
ing signs of improvement. The 
alumni chapter of the music fra-
ternity of Sigma Alpha Iota has 
sponsored a very successful concert 
of works by a half-dozen Lafayette 
composers and has planned at least 
two similar concerts in the near fu-
ture. Likewise, the new director of 
the fledgling Acadiana Symphony 
in Lafayette has commissioned a 
work from a local composer to be 
premiered by his orchestra during 
its inaugural year. 
Each of these achievements may 
seem inconsequential taken singly, 
but taken together they mark a sig-
nificant new direction for the arts 
in a state which until recently was 
better known for rampant illiteracy, 
political graft, and cultural short-
sightedness. They signal a marked 
improvement for the city of Lafay-
ette, which as recently as 1981 ranked 
dead last in a survey of 277 cities in 
"arts facilities" even though it stood 
as high as tenth, just behind Hous-
ton, in "personal economic oppor-
tunity." 
* * * 
If we are witnessing a musical 
renaissance in Louisiana's secular 
arts institutions, the same is more 
difficult to see in the realm of church 
music. True, long-established pro-
grams, such as that at St. Louis Ca-
thedral in New Orleans, continue 
to thrive. This is thanks largely to 
the dedication and perseverence of 
a few very talented musicians, such 
as the Cathedral's renowned music 
director Elise Cambon. Elsewhere, 
however, the reforms of Vatican II 
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have practically eradicated vestiges 
of the centuries-old heritage of Latin 
church music. 
At many churches in this pre-
dominantly Catholic part of Louis-
iana mass is celebrated with no 
music at all. At others, the weekly 
choral mass has become a geriatric 
service where a nostalgic minority 
struggles valiantly to preserve what 
bits of the musical traditions might 
be salvaged. Many priests encour-
age congregational singing to re-
place the old choral rites, but at the 
scores of parishes I have observed 
their efforts are met with compla-
cency or even mild hostility. Young-
er generations have grown up 
without strong choral traditions and 
find the use of elaborate music to be 
a foreign reminder of an "out-
moded" practice. They prefer the 
guitar accompaniments of the folk 
masses which play to packed houses 
at most churches. The Catholic 
presses produce a barrage of folk-
inspired music for these services of 
a quality similar to that found in 
the services of other denominations. 
A small number of local Cath-
olics continue to practice the Tri-
dentine rite, but without the moral 
and financial support of the diocese 
they are unable to match their litur-
gical preferences with the appro-
priate musical panoply. 
At some churches fine old organs 
remain silent at most services. They 
often fall prey to neglect and the 
relentless Louisiana climate and 
are replaced by cheaper electronic 
instruments. The diocese of Lafay-
ette has recently purchased a large 
Casavant organ for its cathedral, a 
move which some hope will set a 
precedent for the purchase of finer 
instruments throughout the diocese. 
Strangely, though, the cathedral 
organ is larger than the building re-
quires and could have been more 
suitably proportioned, thereby free-
ing funds for the improvement of 
instruments in parish churches as 
well. 
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tween extremes. Many local churches have trimmed 
budgets by hiring local pianists 
rather than trained organists to pro-
vide music at mass. As one would 
expect, the quality of service play-
ing by these musicians is quite low. 
In a region where arts awareness is 
a very new concept, this is not of 
great concern to most parishioners. 
A few larger churches, encouraged 
by an increase in offerings, are now 
upgrading their music programs by 
hiring full -time professionally 
trained musicians. Louisiana seems 
perennially to be fluctuating be-
The numerous Protestant de-
nominations in Louisiana are con-
spicuously conservative. Even those 
mainline groups which in the North 
provide a compromise between li-
turgical traditions and pulpit pound-
ing lean here toward a more or less 
overt fundamentalism. Their serv-
ices largely showcase music in the 
country-gospel tradition . The vast 
wealth of Reformation chorales, 
psalms, hymns, and motets is prac-
tically untapped and has been re-
placed by songs of mindless senti-
A remembrance 
of things past: John Berryman 
slated to speak in the Mayo Auditorium 
and almost every summer session student 
vowing to be there. 
Packed house : Berryman shuffles 
past the lectern and stares. 
Silence. He wants more of that: 
absolute quiet. Absolute thickens 
phlegm in dry throats, coughing rattles 
the room, notebooks slide, a cigarette 
lighter clinks against an arm rest, 
breathing is fortissimo ... 
Absolute silence 
After a long time he does not read his poems. 
He talks about Anne Frank. He holds her diary 
like a host speaks of her presence. 
Of that evening, I remember 
these thoughts: "Anne," he said, 
"disciplined herself to get up each morning 
as though hope were at the door. 
There has not been so witnessing a word 
since Augustine's Confessions." 
Grace is everywhere. 
Sister Maura 
The Cresset 
mentality and emotionalism. 
The oil industry has brought with 
it droves of conservative Protestants 
and a corresponding reduction of 
South Louisiana's Catholic majority 
from a one time high of more than 
85 per cent of the population to 
somewhere less than half. Protestant 
growth is most evident in the enor-
mous Baptist churches of the area, 
which are able to mount Broadway-
styled gospel music productions 
with a mind-boggling assortment of 
electronic technologies. The First 
Baptist Church of Lafayette regu-
larly hires a chamber orchestra to 
back up its choirs and each year 
presents a massive pageant which 
it calls a "symphony of song," 
showcasing such guests as Pat or 
Debby Boone. In the past it would 
have been unthinkable to sink such 
huge sums of church resources into 
this type of "ministry." 
The staggering dimensions of 
change in Acadiana may in the end 
be the arts greatest ally. Riding the 
surge, music can establish itself as 
part of the new order while at the 
same time providing a sense of sta-
bility for those who yearn for the 
security of traditions. Last year the 
small town of Mansura in A voyelles 
Parish at the northern tip of the 
Cajun triangle hired Lafayette musi-
cians to accompany a high mass. 
The service was to cap off the local 
festival and would be sung by a 
small amateur choir from the area. 
The music included-in addition 
to a Bruckner motet, various chant 
formulas, and varied hymn settings 
-the Mozart Coronation Mass. It 
was an impressive undertaking. 
It is inconceivable that most of 
those in the pews could actually 
have grasped the full magnitude of 
Mozart's music, yet there was def-
initely a sense of satisfaction and 
spiritual fulfillment to be felt, a 
sense of connection with that con-
tinuity of civilization of which we 
are all part. It is on this foundation 
that the future will be built. Cl 
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Health and Medicine 
In the 
Lutheran Tradition 
By Martin E. Marty. New York: 
Crossroads. 178 pp. $14.95. 
This book is the second in a series 
of volumes edited by Martin Marty 
and Kenneth Vaux. The purpose of 
the series is to explore the ways in 
which major religions relate to the 
questions of human well-being. The 
introductory volume to the series 
was published in 1982 under the 
title Health/ Medic£ne and the Faith 
Traditions. A third volume, Kenneth 
Vaux's Health and Medicine in the 
Reformed Tradition, has also been 
published. Though a great many 
books have been written on the 
church's healing ministry and the 
relationship between faith and 
health, there are no studies of these 
themes from within separate faith 
traditions. The comprehensiveness 
of this series and the excellent repu-
tation of the authors chosen to write 
the individual volumes provide the 
promise that the series will become 
a standard reference work for years 
to come. 
The choice of Marty to author the 
volume on the Lutheran tradition 
is an obvious one. Marty is a highly 
respected church historian who has 
remained a committed Lutheran 
churchman throughout his career. 
Since he is serving with Kenneth 
Vaux as a general editor of the en-
tire series, he was the logical choice 
for this assignment even though 
the area of exploration was new to 
him. 
The book is divided into three 
parts. Part I, entitled "Wellness and 
Illness," is devoted to theoretical 
issues. In this section Marty does a 
theological analysis of wellness and 
illness from a Lutheran point of 
view. Part II, "Caring and Curing," 
examines moral issues in modern 
medicine, the healing ministry of 
the church, and institutions, roles, 
and practices of caring. Part III, 
on "Passages," covers issues in sex-
uality, human development, and 
dying. 
The best chapter in the book is the 
first chapter of Part I, in which 
Marty juxtaposes two questions, 
"Are you saved?" and "How are 
you?" The thesis of the first chapter, 
and ostensibly of the whole book, is 
"that most of what Lutheranism has 
to say about well-be£ng, also in the 
physical sense, is an analogy to 
what the tradition says about being 
saved." More specifically, the thesis 
is that the gospel of the forgiveness 
of sins is the hermeneutical key for 
interpreting what the tradition has 
to say about well-being in general. 
This means, among other things, 
that well-being is primarily a gift 
rather than a duty and that life or-
ganized around the forgiveness of 
sins is the form that all of life should 
take, including physical, emotional, 
and mental life. It means that faith 
should be active in well-being, the 
well-being of others as well as one-
self, because service and obedience 
flow out of one's response to the gos-
pel of forgiveness. It means that 
well-being can be traced to the proc-
ess of God's continual action of 
bringing order out of chaos. It means 
that the gospel assures freedom of 
research in natural science without 
being locked into a scientific world-
view. Though Marty is quick to say 
that these themes are not un£que to 
Lutheranism, he does make a strong 
case for saying that they are dist£nc-
t£ve Lutheran emphases. 
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Marty uses his hermeneutic effec-
tively in the remaining two chapters 
of Part I in which he offers a Lu-
theran understanding of mental 
illness and suffering. He uses Aarne 
Siirala's book on The Voice of Illness 
as an example of a Lutheran ap-
proach to mental illness and 
Luther's theology of the cross as a 
way of understanding suffering. 
Part I by itself is worth the purchase 
of the book, providing a charac-
teristically Lutheran way of thinking 
about wellness and illness. 
The hermeneutic which Marty 
uses so effectively in examining the 
meaning of "wellness and illness" 
in Part I is not nearly as obvious in 
his analysis of the practice of "caring 
and curing" in Part II. This is un-
fortunate since a consistent use of 
the hermeneutic would have pro-
vided the basis for integrating Part 
I (analysis of theory) and Part II 
(analysis of practice). Part II is much 
less readable than Part I- too many 
references to surveys and minor 
theologians and not enough inter-
pretation of the broad sweep of 
history. 
As an interested participant m 
the renewal of healing ministry in 
the church, I think that Marty's 
treatment of the tradition is uneven. 
For example, the chapter on healing 
is devoted almost exclusively to 
charismatic healing with only a pass-
ing reference to medical missions. 
Lutherans were active participants 
in a noble effort in the nineteenth 
century to link modern medicine 
with the healing mission of the 
church. A brief history of that move-
ment along with a comparison and 
contrast to the charismatic move-
ment would have resulted in a much 
more balanced treatment. 
Part III, "Passages," is even weak-
er in my judgment. In less than fifty 
pages Marty attempts to cover com-
plex issues in the broad areas of 
sexuality, family life, generativity, 
psychosocial development, concep-
tion and abortion, faith develop-
ment, and dying. Not only is the 
treatment of these issues done in a 
necessarily cursory manner, but it 
is not obvious to me why a section 
on "passages" should be included 
in a book on health and medicine 
in the Lutheran tradition. Marty is 
not to be faulted for attempting to 
do too much in this book. The series 
is designed so that the same topics 
(ten) will be covered in the analysis 
of each of the faith traditions (ten). 
The problem is that issues in bio-
ethics are much too complex to be 
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treated in the cursory fashion that 
they must be in a survey book of 
this kind. 
In spite of the shortcomings of 
this volume, it is a valuable book for 
opening the door to a rich heritage 
within Lutheranism for understand-
ing health and critically examining 
the contributions of modern medi-
cine. 
Confirmation and the 
Charismata 
By Theodore R. Jungkuntz. New 
York: University Press of America. 
113 pp. $7.75. 
The role of confirmation in the 
church has been a hotly debated 
issue over the past two decades. Is it 
a sacrament? What is its relation to 
baptism? Is it something that God 
does (outpouring of the Holy Spirit) 
or is it something that the person 
does (make a commitment, join the 
church)? Should it be ritualized, 
and if so, at what age should the per-
son be when the ritual is performed? 
These questions are being asked 
within all denominations, and the 
answers that are given often cut 
across denominational lines . 
Such is the case with Confirmation 
and the Charismata by Theodore 
Jungkuntz, professor of theology at 
Valparaiso University. His answers 
to the above questions grow out of 
his participation in the charismatic 
renewal, a renewal that is truly ecu-
menical. Though Jungkuntz is him-
self a deeply confessional Lutheran, 
it is his involvement in the charis-
matic renewal that gives this book 
its distinctive flavor and qualifies 
it as an important contribution to 
ecumenical dialogue. 
The definition of confirmation is 
clearly stated in Chapter One, "Con-
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firmation in the New Testament." 
According to the New Testament, 
Jungkuntz says, the "right way" to 
understand confirmation is to see it 
"as that which God does in response 
to a faith which obediently and 
prayerfully seeks after God." What 
God does is to "strengthen," "seal," 
and "guarantee" the "believer's self-
understanding as a child of God 
and thus equips him or her to carry 
out the call to live the Christian life 
in a manner which builds up the 
church." The charismata (manifesta-
tions of the Holy Spirit) are evi-
dence of confirmation, which is a 
repeatable event rather than an 
isolated, unitary rite. One of the 
strengths of this book, and not just 
the first chapter, is its appeal to 
scriptural authority. Jungkuntz 
makes a strong case for his definition 
on the basis of that authority. 
Jungkuntz suggests that 
Luther's famous tower 
experience was a 
confirmation of his 
baptismal experience 
not the only one, but a 
particularly powerful one. 
The next four chapters are his-
torical studies of the development 
of the theology and practice of con-
firmation in the church. These chap-
ters are written by a scholar for 
scholars. The amateur theologian 
will find them rough sledding. The 
history of confirmation is not easy 
to trace, partly because what even-
tually became official church doc-
trine and practice (confirmation as 
a sacrament for seven-year-olds per-
formed by the bishop in which the 
Holy Spirit is conveyed in richer 
measure on those already baptized) 
evolved slowly and along different 
paths. Originally part of an initia-
tion ceremony which included bap-
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tism and first communion, confirma-
tion gradually became a sacrament 
separated from both baptism and 
first communion. 
As one who has worked with many 
of the same sources on another proj-
ect, I was impressed with Jung-
kuntz's mastery of the historical 
material. To his credit, he presents 
this material without distortion or 
prejudgment on the basis of his own 
interpretation of the meaning and 
importance of confirmation. He 
provides as clear and concise a re-
view of the history of confirmation 
as I have seen anywhere. 
The last chapter, "Confirmation 
in the Twentieth Century," provides 
both an analysis of the current con-
troversy over confirmation and the 
author's own proposal for how con-
firmation should be understood and 
practiced today. Jungkuntz begins 
by describing the influence of three 
renewal movements on the question 
of confirmation: the liturgical re-
newal, the pedagogical renewal, 
and the charismatic renewal. Jung-
kuntz traces the impetus for a re-
appraisal of the liturgical role of 
confirmation to the Vatican II direc-
tive that the "intimate connection 
which this sacrament (confirmation) 
has with the whole of Christian ini-
tiation should be more lucidly set 
forth." These belong together be-
cause "the faithful are born anew by 
baptism, strengthened by the sacra-
ment of confirmation, and finally 
are sustained by the food of eternal 
life in the eucharist." The goal of 
those who are informed by these 
directives, including Lutherans and 
Anglicans, is to restore the ancient 
rite of Christian initiation in which 
baptism, confirmation, and first 
communion are indivisible parts of 
a single whole. The pedagogical 
renewal puts a heavy emphasis on 
confirmation as a sacrament (or rite) 
of maturity in which baptismal faith 
is confirmed "by (increasingly ma-
ture) reaffirmations of that faith." 
Jungkuntz refers to my book on Self 
Realization and Faith as an example 
of how recent studies in faith de-
velopment can be used to support 
both the meaning and practice of 
confirmation as a rite which con-
firms the Christian identity of young 
people. 
The weakness of both the above 
positions is that they say so little 
about the manifestations ofthe Spirit 
which can be expected by those who 
have been baptized. "If we would 
allow our faith to be instructed and 
expanded by the full range of the 
New Testament witness to the Pente-
costal gifts of the Holy Spirit, we 
could once again more decisively 
and more broadly experience 'Con-
firmation' as it was before it was so 
radically reduced to a liturgical 
ritual or to a secularized rite of mat-
uration." It is the experiential di-
mension of confirmation which 
Jungkuntz thinks has been lost. As 
an example, he suggests that Lu-
ther's famous tower experience was 
a confirmation of his baptismal re-
birth-not the only one, of course, 
but a particularly powerful one. 
Jungkuntz notes that there has 
been little effort within the charis-
matic renewal to explicate a theology 
and practice of confirmation. He 
does not claim to speak for the broad 
ecumenical community of charis-
matics, but offers this treatise as a 
basis for discussion not only among 
charismatics but among all those 
who are concerned about the ques-
tion of where confirmation belongs 
in the church today. Towards that 
end he offers at the close of the book 
a set of discussion theses which are 
clearly and cogently stated. I highly 
recommend this book to anyone 
who is interested in the future of 
confirmation in the church. It is val-
uable both for its historical back-
ground as well as the unique contri-
bution it makes from the perspective 
of charismatic renewal to the cur-
rent controversy about confirmation. 
c: Thomas A . Droege 
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Of Pets & People 
Dot Nuechterlein 
Do you consider yourself a friend 
of mine? Careful how you answer 
that- perhaps you should read this 
through first, for I am about to re-
veal an awful character flaw, a trait 
that has the power to separate one 
from most of the rest of polite so-
ciety. 
The simple, honest, painful truth 
is that I hate animals. Did you get 
that? I said, I hate animals! Do you 
have any idea how ostracizing such 
an admission can be? Perhaps hate 
is too strong a word- I do not wish 
the creatures any bodily harm. But 
I would prefer to live my life with-
out ever having anything to do with 
any of them. Even removing them 
all (except maybe giraffes) from the 
face of the earth would be fine by me. 
This is not a popular opinion. 
Practically everyone I have ever 
run into keeps pets, and many peo-
ple claim their animals are like 
members of the family. They act 
like it, too: in fact some adults show-
er more attention and affection on 
their critters than they do on their 
children, and that bothers me. 
For one thing, the sight of people 
(small children and lonely senior 
citizens excepted) kissing and slob-
bering over Fido and Fluffy is re-
volting. But more importantly, the 
message that comes across to some 
sons and daughters is that pets are 
more important and more valued 
than humans. As a high school stu-
dent I worked for a family with that 
attitude, and it has troubled me ever 
since. 
Most families, I'll admit, don't go 
to such extremes; animals share 
their lives without dominating them. 
We had a few friendly beasts while I 
was a child, although none ever 
32 
stayed inside the house, as I recall. 
Subsequently all of my three sisters 
and two brothers grew up normally 
and have lived with dogs and cats 
and other assorted non-humans ever 
since. 
For a long time I thought I was 
the only one with this untypical 
aversion. Then I met the man of 
my dreams. Those who knew us 
when we were dating and became 
engaged thought our relationship 
was doomed to failure; here were 
two very different individuals who 
seemed to have few joint interests. 
Little did they suspect that we had 
discovered a great common bond, 
and that our eventual marriage 
vows included a secret pact: never, 
under any circumstances, would we 
ever allow ourselves or any of those 
in our household to share bed and 
board with furs or feathers. 
This has sometimes been a strug-
gle to maintain, especially when 
small blue eyes pleaded, and once 
we gave in to a gift of goldfish (which 
blessedly lasted no longer than gold-
fish ever do). But together we have 
stood firm and faced down the rest 
of the world. 
How, you might ask, can we pos-
sibly turn cold heart and icy stare 
against darling little puppies and 
bunnies and such? Easy. Animals 
smell. Of course kids do, too, but 
once you get them potty-trained 
and positively motivated towards 
showers and shampoo the more di~­
agreeable aspects of human odor 
can be handled. Nothing, however, 
seems to be do-able about the kitty 
litter under the kitchen table (retch) 
and the doggie dirt in the backyard 
(barf). 
Most pets also shed stuff off of 
their bodies. I am not allergic to 
hairs and dander, but I sometimes 
wish I were-that has become a so-
cially acceptable way to keep ani-
mals at a distance. I just find their 
leavings on my clothing and belong-
ings to be disagreeable. Now kids 
also shed things but can be threat-
ened with serious consequences if 
they don't learn to pick them up. 
Unfortunately I have an over-
developed sense of fastidiousness 
(invisible as it may be to other eyes) 
so that I find it offensive to be licked 
or pecked at by some other species. 
In addition I am not a hugger by 
nature or practice. Oh, indeed I do 
hug and kiss people, but almost al-
ways those whom I know and care 
about. At times I feel assaulted when 
just any old body gets "familiar," so 
you can see that given my opinion 
of animals, being jumped upon and 
such brings me to the brink of 
apoplexy. 
No, give me children any time. Of 
course kids don't make perfect com-
panions, either. No soft little fuzzy 
thing is likely to snarl at you in re-
sponse to a simple greeting like 
"Good morning," or give away your 
treasured magazines to a Boy Scout 
paper drive without asking, or turn 
up the volume on the car radio to 
the zillionth decibel, or become an 
utter stranger the moment a school 
friend wanders by, and so on. And 
only boys and girls and men and 
women can break one another's 
hearts. But to me that's worth the 
gamble. 
Some months ago syndicated col-
umnist Mike Royko was heaped with 
abuse when he wrote of his scorn for 
little bitty dogs (although he likes 
big ones, for some unfathomable 
reason). I know that's what's in store 
for me, too- the old editor's mailbox 
will overflow with hate mail and 
threats of cancelled subscriptions, 
so this bit may be my last. 
Why risk it? Simply to encourage 
the two or three of you out there 
who are fellow misoanimalysts not 
to be intimidated; and to let every-
one else know that you pet people 
may control the world, but you'll 
never get our souls. Cl 
The Cresset 
